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The future of electricity supply and delivery on the continent of Africa represents one of the thorniest 
challenges facing professionals in the global energy, economics, finance, environmental, and 
philanthropic communities.   
Roughly 600 million people in Africa lack any access to electricity.  If this deficiency is not solved, 
extreme poverty for many Africans is virtually assured for the foreseeable future, as it is widely 
recognized that economic advancement cannot be achieved in the 21st Century without good electricity 
supply.  Yet, if Africa were to electrify in the same manner pursued in developed economies around the 
world during the 20th Century, the planet’s global carbon budget would be vastly exceeded, greatly 
exacerbating the worldwide damages from climate change.   
Moreover, due to low purchasing power in most African economies and fiscal insolvency of most African 
utilities, it is unclear exactly how the necessary infrastructure investments can be deployed to bring 
ample quantities of power – especially zero-carbon power – to all Africans, both those who currently are 
unconnected to any grid as well as those who are now served by expensive, high-emitting, limited and 
unreliable electricity supply. 
With the current population of 1.3 billion people expected to double by 2050, the above-noted 
challenges associated with the African electricity sector may well get substantially worse than they 
already are – unless new approaches to infrastructure planning, development, finance and operation 
can be mobilized and propagated across the continent. 
This paper presents a summary of the present state and possible futures for the African electricity 
sector.  A synthesis of an ever-growing body of research on electricity in Africa, this paper aims to 
provide the reader a thorough and balanced context as well as general conclusions and 
recommendations to better inform and guide decision-making and action.  
Major Findings 
It is impossible to definitively answer in one survey paper all possible questions one might reasonably 
pose about the future advancement of the African electricity sector.  Also, the availability and quality of 
data pertaining to the African electricity sector is low, which limits the depth of analysis that can be 
undertaken. 
Even so, some notable overarching findings can be asserted, including: 
 
• To achieve a minimal level of universal energy access across Africa, at least $20 billion per year 
of new infrastructure investment – comprising both generation and grid assets – will be 
required.  To the extent that a greater degree of energy availability than minimal amounts is to 
be achieved for all Africans, the investment requirement would accordingly be larger – and 
probably substantially larger.  Spread over the next few decades, the capital need is on the 
order of $1 trillion.   
 
• The mix in the pace of additions of coal power plants and renewable energy projects will heavily 
shape the future trajectory of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions associated with African electricity 
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generation.  Given shortages of electricity supply across virtually all of Africa, it is implausible to 
expect retirement of existing fossil-fired generation assets anytime soon.  However, choices on 
new generation will matter significantly, and major plans are underway to add coal capacity in 
many African nations, despite increasingly compelling economics and abundant supplies of 
renewable energy resources – notably, hydro, solar and wind. 
 
• The weakness of transmission grids across Africa – particularly between countries – impedes the 
ability to effectively develop new large power projects, irrespective of type.  This fact drives 
African electricity sector development towards a greater reliance on generation additions in 
smaller increments – which in turn provides additional impetus for the deployment of solar and 
wind projects that are already benefitting from declining cost trends.  The advancement of 
energy storage technologies will also support an increasing trend towards distributed renewable 
energy generation assets. 
 
• The preferable electricity sector development path for Africa is likely to be quite different for 
rural and urban regions on the continent.  The latter will leverage the existing grid to the extent 
possible via refurbishments and targeted investments, while the former can take advantage of 
the emergence of novel distributed energy resources technologies and business models to 
deploy entirely new microgrids that have lower capital requirements – and thus the prospect of 
lower risks to investors.  Over time, emergent rural microgrids and redeveloped urban grids can 
gradually merge into a “grid of grids” spreading out across the African continent from initial 
clusters of viability. 
 
Additional Observations 
Moreover, this paper offers the following general observations to help provide a proper orientation for 
further activities to advance the African electricity sector: 
• It is neither possible nor prudent to think about the African electricity sector monolithically 
• The future African electricity infrastructure must look different than today’s 
• Investment requirements are massive, but risks will inhibit capital attraction 
• Achieving maximum beneficial impact requires great selectivity when targeting resources 
• African electricity sector institutions need substantial strengthening 
• Electricity sector advancement is part of a bigger whole in advancing African prosperity 
• Advancing the electricity sector is first and foremost about serving the needs of Africans 
 
Since scarcity of good data is one of the few universal truths across the African electricity sector, a 
geographically focused research agenda will be an essential first step for virtually any initiative, to build 
a robust fact base with which further analysis can be undertaken.  Such research about electricity 
infrastructure, operations and demand would fall under three main areas of inquiry: 
• How can current grid assets be leveraged more effectively? 
• What should be the expansion plan for the current grid? 






The status of the electricity sector on the African continent – especially in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) – is 
gaining increasing attention worldwide, and not just among economic development professionals. 
The basic statistics are staggering.  As the International Energy Agency (IEA) puts it, “Despite being home 
to almost a fifth of the world’s population, Africa accounts for little more than 3% of global electricity 
demand.”  Of this disproportionately low figure, North African countries and South Africa consume 
nearly three-quarters of African electricity demand, even though SSA countries are home to over 80% of 
the continent’s population.i   
These statistics imply that the enormous SSA region consumes virtually no electricity:  an estimated 55% 
of the SSA population does not have access to any electricity supply, while the remaining 45% who are 
connected to an electricity network consume relatively little electricity, at least partly because electricity 
is frequently unavailable.ii  
The African population is expected by the United Nations (UN) to approximately double to 2.5 billion 
between now and 2050. iii   Between population growth and economic upside, Africa represents 
arguably the largest underserved growth market in the world.  Untold trillions of dollars of potential 
consumer purchasing power await to be tapped.   
Yet, this upside cannot be realized without a quantum leap in African electricity infrastructure:  most 
places in Africa do not have 24/7/365 availability of electricity, a service that is essential for economic 
activity and mostly taken for granted in most developed economies worldwide.  
The inadequacy of electricity infrastructure is both cause and effect of Africa’s economic 
underdevelopment.  Economic output is inextricably tied to affordable and consistent availability of 
modern forms of energy, without which the ability for productive activity to contribute to the digitized 
global economy is limited.   
Given economies with very low levels of purchasing power, electricity infrastructure developers face 
great difficulties in securing financing for new assets in SSA.  Unfortunately, the risks of making long-
term investments in most African nations are considerable, and a prospective asset owner cannot in 
practice repossess an underperforming electricity infrastructure investment. 
The challenges inherent in developing the African electricity sector are compounded by the urgent need 
to undertake any expansion in a manner that preserves or improves environmental conditions in Africa.  
Africa’s unique ecosystems, critical to global biodiversity, could easily be damaged by imprudent power 
sector development.   
Furthermore, most developed areas in Africa already suffer greatly from bad air quality, in many cases 
exacerbated by reliance upon diesel generators and other fossil fuel combustion with insufficient 
pollution controls.   
In addition to local environmental concerns, the future role of the African electricity sector will be 
pivotal in the future trajectory of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and their global impact on the pace of 
climate change.    
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To mitigate the threats posed by climate change, it is vital that the electricity sector in every part of the 
world quickly reduce its reliance on fossil fuels, the primary source of the CO2 emissions that are driving 
climate change.  Whereas most developed economies are experiencing declines in CO2 emissions in 
large part because their electricity sectors are decarbonizing, there is substantial impetus to add fossil-
based electricity generation capacity at a rapid pace in Africa in order to accelerate progress on 
improving energy access.  
If Africa were to electrify in the 21st Century in a manner similar to the manner undertaken by the 
United States in the 20th Century, there is virtually no possibility for the world to meet global emissions 
targets that can limit the damages associated with climate change.  This is not just an idealistic concern 
for Africans:  as noted recently by the Brookings Institution, “Africa is the most-exposed region to the 
effects of climate change despite contributing the least to global warming.”iv 
The need for infrastructure deployment to provide universal energy access as soon as practically 
possible, while at the same time doing so in an environmentally-friendly way, has led to a bipolar vision 
for the expansion of the African power sector over the next few decades.    
• At one extreme, some energy industry observers such as the Rocky Mountain Institute (RMI) 
suggest that the expansion of the Africa electricity sector will (or should) largely occur from the 
“bottom up” by decentralized solar and wind systems, often in village microgrids.v  Proponents 
of this model for electric expansion argue that, because many of the existing large power 
systems in Africa are already unable to meet power demand with reliability and fiscal integrity, 
decentralized expansion of clean resources not reliant on existing institutions is the fastest – and 
in a growing number of cases, cheapest – path to clean universal energy access. 
 
• At the other extreme, other sector development experts such as China’s Global Energy 
Interconnection Development and Cooperation Organization (GEIDCO) envision expanding the 
grid in a manner that maximizes the use of Africa’s abundant, high-quality renewable resources 
in large-scale generation basins connected by an expanded grid to deliver power to all corners of 
the continent.vi   Pursuit of this vision would allow the development of massive unrealized 
renewable energy potential in large yet mostly unpopulated swaths of the continent, bringing 
ample quantities of zero-carbon and zero variable cost electricity to mega-cities, towns and 
villages alike in more habitable regions of Africa. 
As the future unfolds, actual development of the African electricity sector is unlikely to be characterized 
by either of these two ends of the spectrum  Rather, expansion of African electricity will undoubtedly 
involve a mix of approaches, including additions of both distributed and centralized electricity 
infrastructure assets in proportions that will vary based on many location-specific factors.    
The expansion path for each country’s power sector will be a unique function of national circumstances 
and planned economic development pathway, regional resources and institutions, and international 
efforts.    
The importance of the electric power sector in driving economic and environmental outcomes, and the 
complex interaction between the many intervening variables, is illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1:  Future Trajectory of African Electricity Infrastructure Development Will Drive African 
Economic Growth and Emissions 
 
Source: ISE original  
This paper addresses the intricate and intertwined nature of these important relationships, exploring 
the issues and implications associated with possible African electricity sector development pathways 
that expand energy access in a low-carbon manner.   
In recent years, a large body of literature on the opportunities and challenges facing Africa’s electricity 
sector is accumulating.   Indeed, in just the four months preceding the issuance of this paper, three 
comprehensive reports on the African electricity sector were released: 
• Africa Energy Outlook 2019 by the IEA 
• Research on Africa Energy Interconnection by GEIDCO 
• Sub-Saharan Market Outlook 2020 by BloombergNEF 
This paper integrates and synthesizes the findings from these three studies, along with other publicly 
available research completed during the past several years.   
Research Approach and Roadmap for This Paper 
This paper aims to achieve the following objectives: 
• Review the growing body of literature on Africa’s electricity sector in order to: 
o Develop a set of insights and conclusions about how electricity infrastructure is likely to 
advance across Africa, paying special attention to the factors that will drive 
development towards centralized versus decentralized system growth; and 
o Identify gaps in understanding that constrain productive activities to advance electricity 
infrastructure enhancement in Africa 
• Search for policy and market innovations that can accelerate the growth of low- and no-carbon 
resource additions; and 
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• Suggest a forward-looking research agenda to increase prospects for successful improvement in 
electricity sector performance wherever advancement is pursued in Africa 
Despite the growing body of excellent work on the African electricity sector, developing a holistic 
perspective on its current status, future trajectory, and recommendations to accelerate its advancement 
most prudently remains a daunting task.  This is for two primary reasons: 
• First, there is no such thing as an “African electricity grid”.  Africa is an immense and 
immeasurably diverse continent, encompassing 54 very different countries, 1.3 billion people, 
and dozens of geographic zones defined more by various topographical, ecological and cultural 
boundaries than lines on a map.  Economic integration between (and usually even within) 
national economies is weak:  across much of Africa, the basic organizational building block of 
society continues to be the tribe rather than the nation, and commerce is conducted under pre-
modern norms.  It is therefore impossible to intelligently assess the electricity situation across 
Africa as one whole.  Instead, scattered across the continent is a disparate collection of 
inconsistently developed and administered electricity activities, few of which cross national 
boundaries.  Although there are five regional power pools across the continent, the lack of 
strong transmission interties has prevented them (at least thus far) from being a major force for 
pan-African electricity planning or operations.  As a result, conclusions or recommendations 
pertinent to one specific locale somewhere in Africa may have limited applicability or relevance 
to many (or even most) other places in Africa. 
 
• Second, the state of basic data about electricity activities in Africa is poor.  In most developed 
economies around the world, the electricity sector is regulated and overseen by governmental 
authorities, and companies participating in the electricity value chain are compelled by both 
commercial and regulatory forces to document the basis for their investment and operating 
decisions.  The resulting set of data and analysis about electricity sector activities is voluminous 
– and much of it publicly-available.  This is simply not the case in Africa.  Where data does exist, 
its quality, consistency or vintage is suspect – thus reducing the ability to perform accurate 
analysis or develop grounded forecasts.  Anecdotal evidence is often the best-available 
information.  So, while the volume of good research on African electricity is growing, the raw 
data underlying the expanding body of literature remains patchy. 
Based on extensive review of the available literature (including data and analyses) on electricity in Africa 
and distillation of the most important findings, this paper is structured as follows: 
• In Section I, the magnitude of the electricity infrastructure investment opportunity is sized at 
roughly $1 trillion to close of the African energy access gap – and likely much more if electricity 
supply availability is desired above minimal levels.  
• In Section II, two emergent alternative approaches for expanding the African electricity 
infrastructure – centralized solar and wind energy projects and off-grid systems based on 
distributed energy resources (DER) – are described, including how the two will combine into a 
“grid-of-grids”. 
• In Section III, the spectrum of risks associated with electricity infrastructure investment activities 
in Africa is characterized. 
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• In Section IV, non-governmental organizations and other non-profit organizations active in the 
African electricity sector are profiled, including examples of the activities they are undertaking 
to improve the landscape for advancement. 
• In Section V, conclusions are offered about the likely future evolution of the African electricity 
sector – emphasizing the need for market participants and researchers/advocates alike to focus 




I:  $1 trillion Investment Need in Africa for Electricity Infrastructure 
 
The expansion of electricity infrastructure in Africa represents the enabling foundation for unlocking 
heretofore untapped advancement potential of enormous magnitude.  Strengthening the African 
electricity sector thus represents one of the world’s most consequential financial, economic and social 
opportunities of the 21st Century. 
In this section summarizing the African electricity sector, the following topics will be discussed: 
• How energy poverty in most African countries correlates with economic poverty  
• The low rates of energy access in most African nations 
• Prospects for electricity demand growth in Africa 
• The current inadequacies of electricity supply infrastructure in Africa 
• The role for the five regional power pools that have been established in Africa 
• Projected growth in electric generating capacity in Africa and associated CO2 emissions  
• Future African electricity generation mix, particularly the roles of coal, gas and renewables 
• Approximately $1 trillion of capital investments required in African electricity infrastructure 
Correlation Between Economic Poverty and Energy Poverty 
Especially south of the Sahara Desert, Africa suffers from both economic poverty and electricity poverty.  
Indeed, these two social ills are intertwined: across the globe over the past several decades, it is well-
established that economic vitality and energy consumption are highly correlated.  As Figure 1-1 
indicates, the relationship between power and progress is strong – and many SSA nations exhibit both 
low electricity consumption and low per capital income relative to other countries around the world. 
Figure 1-1: Strong Correlation Between National Economic Activity and Electricity Consumption (2011 
Data) 
 
Source: Brighter Africa:  The Growth Potential of the Sub-Saharan Electricity Sector, McKinsey & Co, 2015  
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Since it is seen as both cause and consequence of Africa’s depressed economic condition, significant 
human attention and financial capital have been and continue to be paid to expand African electricity 
infrastructure.   
Despite increasing efforts to expand electricity infrastructure, now two decades into the 21st Century, 
conditions in much of Africa remain essentially at pre-industrial levels, due to the widespread lack of 
electricity.  The summary statistics are staggering: 
• 55% of the population in SSA, or roughly 600 million people, lack access to electricity.vii 
• Per capita consumption of electricity in SSA is estimated at 484 kWh per year – only 6% of OECD 
country averages.viii  
Without significant investments in electricity expansion, these statistics may worsen over the next few 
decades, given expected African population growth of 2.3% per year – the highest projected growth rate 
of any continent on Earth.ix  
Numerous organizations around the world are mobilizing to address African electricity supply and 
availability deficits.  To illustrate: 
• The global economic development community has established an ambitious set of 17 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including goal 7 (SDG7) entitled “Affordable and Clean 
Energy” that aims “to ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for 
all” people of the world by 2030.   
• Organizations such as the African Development Bank (AfDB), the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) and the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), along with initiatives such as the 
Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI), are playing ever-increasing roles in promoting 
advancement of the African electricity sector.   
• More recently, the Rockefeller Foundation has partnered with the MIT Energy Initiative to form 
the Global Commission to End Energy Poverty (GCEEP), specifically aiming to address the 
particularly vexing challenge of bringing electricity to villages not currently served by the grid. 
To provide ample supplies of zero-carbon and affordable energy to all, the portfolio of electricity assets 
in Africa not only must be dramatically expanded but must also be radically reshaped – with the new 
assets looking substantially different from the existing infrastructure.  Bringing power and progress to 
the African continent for the 21st Century thus represents a massive investment opportunity.   
Low Rates of Energy Access 
While the concept is subject to imprecision, the phrase “energy access” implies at least a minimal 
degree of electricity available to customers so that they can power at least a few appliances at least 
some of the time.  In other words, customers with electricity access can use more than merely battery-
powered lights or radios.   
The IEA has estimated that about half of the population across Africa does not currently have access to 
any electricity.  Although the statistics remain startling, this is nevertheless a notable improvement in 
the two decades since the new millennium, when roughly 2/3 of the African population lacked 
electricity.x   
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Electricity access statistics at the continental level mask very large disparities across the continent.  For 
instance, in Northern Africa, electricity access is now nearly universal.  In contrast, in SSA, most people 
(55%) do not have access to electricity.xi  As shown in Figure 1-2, within SSA, progress to improve energy 
access has been most pronounced in East Africa, while Central Africa lags the most. 
Figure 1-2:  Recent Improvements in Energy Access Rates Across Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Source:  Africa Energy Outlook, IEA, 2019 
However, because of expected population growth over the coming decades, continuation of current 
programs to improve energy access will just hold constant (at roughly 600 million) the absolute number 
of Africans without electricity access.  Put another way, Figure 1-3 shows that, under the status quo, 
energy access rates will still fall well short of 100% through 2040 in many parts of Africa – despite the 
fact that several African countries have established targets to provide universal (or near-universal) 
access before then. 
Figure 1-3:  Projected Energy Access Rates in Africa Through 2040 
 
Source:  Africa Energy Outlook, IEA, 2019 
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The disparities in energy access rates across Africa are even more extreme at the country level, as 
shown in Figure 1-4. 
Figure 1-4:  Energy Access Rates for African Nations in 2015 
 
Source:  Bright Perspectives for Solar Power in Africa?, Institut Montaigne, 2020 
 
Even in the relatively wealthy country of the Republic of South Africa (RSA), more than 10% of the 
population lacks electricity.  Meanwhile, in four countries (Central African Republic, Chad, Sierra Leone 
and South Sudan), more than 90% of the population lives without electricity.  Indeed, in South Sudan, 
there is virtually no electricity available.xii 
Consequently, large numbers of citizens in most SSA countries lack energy access.  As shown in Figure 1-
5, the five African countries with the largest number of citizens lacking access to electricity are: 
• Nigeria (78 million) 
• Democratic Republic of the Congo (77 million) 
• Ethiopia (59 million) 
• Tanzania (37 million) 




Figure 1-5:  Population Without Energy Access in African Nations in 2018  
 
Source:  Africa Energy Outlook, IEA, 2019 
Unsurprisingly, the electricity that is available in Africa is concentrated in urban areas, where greater 
density and economic activity levels make the provision of electricity more viable.  Even so, in urban 
areas of Africa, nearly one-quarter of people live without electricity.  In contrast, in rural areas across 
the continent, nearly 70% of people lack electricity access.xiii  
Indeed, a major demographic consequence of the lack of electricity access in rural areas of Africa is 
projected population migration to urban areas, where economic opportunities (in significant degree, 
enabled by electricity supply) are better.  As a result, the urban population in SSA could increase by over 
500 million people by 2040.xiv  Since many of the continent’s largest cities are already severely stressed 
on a number of social and environmental dimensions, this migration could further worsen quality of life 
in African cities – especially if urban energy supply quality is not enhanced. 
Unless and until Africa’s energy access gap is much more fully addressed, the higher rates of economic 
activity found in the developed world may be difficult to attain.  As exhibited in Figure 1-6, even energy 
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access rates as high as 90% may be insufficient to allow a country to achieve the wealth levels of North 
America and Europe. 
Figure 1-6:  High National Per Capita Income Typically Requires >95% Energy Access 
 
Source: Brighter Africa:  The Growth Potential of the Sub-Saharan Electricity Sector, McKinsey & Co, 2015  
And, if energy access improvements are achieved in Africa by relying mostly upon fossil fuels, the 
environmental consequences – particularly climate change – could be highly adverse. 
In any event, the entire energy access issue should be considered with care, as energy access statistics 
can be deceptive in two important ways:   
1. “Access” doesn’t imply availability of electricity on a 24/7/365 basis.  In much of Africa, even 
where the power grid exists and customers are nominally deemed to have energy “access”, 
electricity is frequently unavailable, usually because demand exceeds supply, leading to 
blackouts or power rationing.  As indicated in Figure 1-7, outages on the local electricity grid are 
frequent and widespread across much of Africa. 





Figure 1-7:  African Electricity Customers Subject to Frequent and Prolonged Power Outages 
 
Source:  Solar for Businesses in Sub-Saharan Africa, BloombergNEF, 2019 
 
2. “Access” doesn’t mean electricity infrastructure capable of producing and delivering quantities 
of electricity to users at volumes typical of consumption patterns in developed economies.  As 
shown previously, the relationship between per capita income and per capita electricity use is 
strongly positive – and moreover is highly non-linear.xv  Reflecting this, virtually nowhere in 
Africa has “access” to electricity in abundance comparable to North America or Europe, and 
most Africans connected to the grid subsisting at the most minimal level of access.  Figure 1-8 
illustrates a taxonomy describing five conceptual tiers of energy access, as defined by the IEA, 
which is widely considered to be the world’s thought-leader on this topic.   
 
Figure 1-8 Five “Tiers” of Energy Access With Increasing Degrees of Electricity Consumption 
 





In this taxonomy, entry-level “Tier 1” energy access characteristic of much of Africa means that a 
customer can only power a light bulb or a radio for a few hours a day.  Meanwhile, “Tier 5” 
access reflects the degree of electricity service typically available in North America or Europe, 
able to power any combination of heavy-duty appliances at any time.  In terms of peak capacity, 
which is akin to bandwidth for electricity service, Tier 5 access is three orders of magnitude 
greater – with correspondingly much higher capital costs to provide the necessary generation 
and delivery capacity – than Tier 1 access. 
Thus, a goal of “100% electricity access” effectively means that some kind of power distribution system 
should exist in every village of a country – but it does not ensure that the electricity from this system is 
always (or even most of the time) available or that the system could support most households 
consuming electricity in quantities – or at the lower prices – characteristic of developed economies.   
In other words, policymakers often make assumptions that reduce the realistic scope of the energy 
access problem in Africa, setting the bar extremely low wherein the most minimal level of investments – 
and minimal corresponding increases in electricity consumption – will suffice. 
Even so, just to bring the most basic Tier 1 level of electricity to every African, the gap between current 
levels of African energy access and the UN SDG7 goal of 100% energy access by 2030 is clearly very 
large.   
It is unclear realistically how quickly such a large gap can be closed – particularly since growth in 
electricity demand rarely occurs without economic growth already happening too. 
Electricity Demand Poised for Growth 
Because electricity demand is usually tied to economic activity and wealth, it is particularly difficult for a 
viable electricity sector to gain a foothold for sustainable growth where no grid exists and where the 
population has very limited purchasing power, as is now the case in many parts of SSA.   
Before any industry can take root, there first needs to be a meaningful and consistent level of electricity 
demand. For those living in developed economies, a sizable foundation of demand for electricity is 
generally taken for granted, wherein everyone alive has always had electric lights, refrigerators, 
televisions, and (more recently) computers.  
 In contrast, where there has never been electricity, no-one owns any electricity-consuming devices, and 
because of low purchasing power, establishing some initial level of electricity demand in a financially 
sustainable way is challenging.   
Figure 1-9 illustrates the initial growth steps of a household’s monthly electricity consumption as new 
appliances are added, indicating how small those first steps can be and the significance of the first major 




Figure 1-9:  Initial Step Increases in Electricity Consumption as Appliances Are Added After Energy 
Access Is Brought to New Customers 
 
Source:   “Assessing Africa’s Off-Grid Electricity Demand”, Engineers Without Borders, 2019 
But even these small initial steps in electricity consumption are economically difficult for many Africans.  
Given low purchasing power in most African nations, expenditures on electricity consume a relatively 




As shown in Figure 1-10, for households in many African nations, more than 10% of income is required 
to operate a refrigerator.  In Liberia, the average household would need to allocate essentially half its 
income on refrigeration, thus limiting the ability for most to possess perishable foods and medicines. 
Figure 1-10:  Percent of Average Household Income Required to Power a Refrigerator, By Country 
 
Source:  Electricity Access in Sub-Saharan Africa, World Bank, 2019 
Compounding the lack of purchasing power for electricity across Africa is a low indicated willingness to 
pay for the introduction of electricity services.  Figure 1-11 shows that less than 20% of Rwandans are 
willing to pay for electricity.  Even for the wealthiest 20% of Rwandans, not even 40% are willing to part 
with money for electricity service. 
Figure 1-11 Few Households Willing to Pay for Electricity Service in Rwanda 
 
Source:  Electricity Access in Sub-Saharan Africa, World Bank, 2019 
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The aversion to pay for electricity in Africa is further reflected by the high degree of electricity theft and 
low degree of electricity bill collection prevalent in many African countries.  To provide two illustrations 
of this phenomenon: 
• Eskom, the national utility in RSA, reported that about $350 million worth of electricity was lost 
to theft in 2015.xvi 
• The national utility in Liberia (the Liberia Electricity Commission) is reported to lose over 60% of 
electricity generated to power theft.xvii 
Moreover, as seen in Figure 1-12, electricity service is not easy to obtain:  for those customers in Africa 
who do want to connect to the electricity grid, new hookups take a very long time. 
Figure 1-12: Average Number of Weeks to Complete Electricity Connection in Africa 
 
Source:  Electricity Access in Sub-Saharan Africa, World Bank, 2019 
For the above reasons, as well as a long legacy of barriers to education and commerce socially 
embedded during the continent’s colonial era, electricity demand growth in Africa has been slow to take 
off. 
In general, any phenomenon that starts from a small base usually experiences relatively high growth 
rates until maturity is achieved.  At least to date, this hasn’t been the case for African electricity 
consumption:  since 2010, African electricity use (as measured by electricity generation levels) increased 
from 560 TWh to 705 TWh in 2018, or 3% per year – only half the growth rate of developing economies 
in Asia.xviii   
Almost certainly, the rate of African electricity consumption growth would likely have been higher if 
infrastructure had been expanded (or had been able to expand) even faster.  Put another way, even 
though demand-side fundamentals aren’t yet strong, growth in the African electricity sector has 
generally been supply-constrained. 
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This situation is expected to pertain for many years to come.  And, without aggressive action to expand 
infrastructure even more rapidly, the electricity supply deficit may well worsen:  in its most recent 
assessment, the IEA forecasts electricity consumption growth to be higher in SSA than any other region 
in the world – in part due to the significant degree of urbanization expected to occur in Africa.xix 
Figure 1-13 presents IEA’s most recent projections of electricity consumption growth in SSA (excluding 
the Republic of South Africa).   
Figure 1-13:  IEA Projections of Electricity Consumption Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding 
Republic of South Africa) 
 
Source:  Africa Energy Outlook, IEA, 2019 
Even in its more moderate “Stated Policies” case reflecting status quo conditions, the IEA forecasts 
electricity demand to grow at 6.5% year through 2040, to approximately 800 TWh.  Moreover, under 
IEA’s more aggressive “Africa Case” reflecting attainment of mid-century economic/social development 
ambitions that have been established by the African Union, electricity demand growth approaches 10% 
per year, reaching nearly 1,500 TWh by 2040.xx 
Electricity consumption growth rates of 6% per year are generally consistent with an outlook recently 
produced by GEIDCO in which total African electricity consumption reaches approximately six times 
current levels by 2050.xxi  
More conservatively, as presented in Figure 1-14, analysis from the consulting firm McKinsey & 
Company suggests that electricity consumption in SSA will nearly quadruple between 2010 and 2040, 
growing at 4.5% per year over the next few decades, with residential electricity demand growing at an 




Figure 1-14:  McKinsey Projections of Electricity Consumption Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa  
 
Source:  Brighter Africa:  The Growth Potential of the Sub-Saharan Electricity Sector, McKinsey & 
Company, 2015 
It is noteworthy that McKinsey’s projections are based on increasing the rates of customer grid-
connection where (or close to where) the grid already exists, from 34% in 2010 to 71% by 2040.  In other 
words, most forecasted demand growth is not due to bringing electricity to places far removed from the 
current grid, but rather due to increasing two factors where grid-based electricity is already to some 
degree available:  (1) customer penetration and density and (2) average use per customer.   
After accounting for another 8% from off-grid connections expected in rural areas, McKinsey estimates 
that 79% of sub-Saharan Africans are expected to have at least some form of electricity access by 2040.  
If true, although not meeting UN SDG7, this would nevertheless be a major accomplishment.  
Whatever the electricity demand growth rate in Africa turns out to be, the growth rate in electricity 
supply must be at least as high.  The fundamental choices in expanding Africa’s electric generating 




Insufficiencies in African Electricity Supply 
Turning to the supply side of the African electricity equation:  the electricity asset base in most African 
countries consists of relatively few power stations, supplying electricity distribution grids serving only 
those cities and larger towns with relatively significant economic activity, with power getting from plant 
to market generally via isolated point-to-point transmission lines.  The lack of high-voltage transmission 
infrastructure in Africa – and especially across most of SSA – is evidenced in Figure 1-15. 
Figure 1-15:  Limited Electricity Transmission Network Across Africa  
 
Source:  Research on African Energy Interconnection, GEIDCO, 2019 
Correspondingly, very little electricity is traded internationally in Africa – not only because of minimal 
cross-border transmission linkages, but also because most countries have grossly insufficient availability 
of power to serve their own needs.  Figure 1-16 shows that only ten African countries import and four 
African countries export more than 50 megawatts on an annual-average basis. 
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Figure 1-16:  Largest Power Importers and Exporters in Africa  
 
Source:  ISE original (based on data from 2016 UN Energy Statistics Yearbook) 
Even though volumes of international electricity transfers in Africa are generally small, this is not to say 
that all African countries aren’t reliant on electricity trade.  In fact, a few countries depend critically on 
cross-national electricity transactions. 
As shown in Figure 1-17, four countries (Benin, Eswatini, Namibia and Niger) import more electricity 
than they produce domestically, and two countries (Mozambique and Cote d’Ivoire) export at least 15% 
of their electricity production. 
Figure 1-17:  African Nations Most Reliant on Power Imports and Exports 
 
Source:  ISE original (based on data from 2016 UN Energy Statistics Yearbook) 
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In many cases, the international flows of electricity in Africa that do occur are associated with large 
industrial facilities served by dedicated long-distance transmission lines:  enabling supply from low-cost 
generation based in another country, or export of generation excess to the local host industry’s needs. 
While it may seem paradoxical that many African nations depend a lot on electricity trade even though 
electricity trade volumes are small, this is because African electricity systems – both the transmission 
system and the power generation base – never attained the extent and robustness of the electricity 
systems found (and now taken for granted) in North America and Europe.  Due to persistent economic 
stagnation and high degrees of financial risk across Africa, global capital markets have only irregularly 
financed expansion of the African electricity infrastructure over the past several decades.   
On a per capita basis, Figure 1-18 demonstrates that the per capita magnitude of installed grid-based 
generation capacity in most African countries is far below levels found on other continents.   
Figure 1-18:  Megawatts of Installed Electric Generating Capacity Per Million People, By Country  
 
 
Source:  “Low Electricity Supply in Sub-Saharan Africa:  Causes, Implications and Remedies”, Journal of 
International Commerce and Economics, US International Trade Commission, 2018  
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As shown in Figure 1-19, the installed base of electrical generating capacity in Africa totaled 
approximately 236 GW by 2018, having grown from 145 GW since 2010 at 6% per year – twice the rate 
of growth in recent electricity consumption, reinforcing the notion that demand growth can only follow 
(and not lead) supply growth. 
Figure 1-19:  Recent Growth in African Electricity Generation Base (in Megawatts)  
 
Source:  African Energy Data Book, African Energy Live, 2018 
Meanwhile, Figure 1-20 presents the mix of electricity generation sources in Africa.   
Figure 1-20:  African Electricity Generation Mix  
 
Source:  Africa Energy Outlook, IEA, 2019 
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In Figure 1-20, the IEA depicts the African electricity generation mix in three distinct regions:   
• North Africa, representing almost half of African electricity capacity (and where most recent 
growth has occurred); dominated by natural gas 
• The Republic of South Africa (RSA), experiencing minimal growth, now accounting for nearly 
one-third of Africa’s capacity; dominated by coal 
• The rest of SSA, less than 20% of Africa’s capacity; mostly from hydro 
Across the entire continent of Africa, fossil fuels – coal (40%), natural gas (30%) and oil (9%) – account 
for nearly 80% of electricity production, with hydropower contributing 16%, and tiny shares for nuclear 
and other renewables.  Virtually all recent growth in African electricity generation can be attributed to 
natural gas, and most of that has occurred in North Africa.   
Given the dominance of fossil fuels in the generation mix, as the electricity sector has expanded in 
recent decades, so too have Africa’s CO2 emissions – the primary contributing factor to climate change. 
From a global and historical perspective, because of its relatively low economic advancement and 
industrial activity over the course of humankind’s fossil fuel era, Africa has been responsible for only 3% 
of total anthropogenic CO2 emissions cumulatively to date, despite being home to approximately 17% of 
the world’s population.xxii  This fact makes it problematic to press African stakeholders to take 
disproportionate steps to mitigate the future trajectory of CO2 emissions. 
Notwithstanding these caveats, it is important to note that CO2 emissions from the African electricity 
sector have nevertheless risen substantially in more recent decades, increasing by nearly a factor of ten 
(or almost 4% annual compounded growth) in the past 60 years, as presented in Figure 1-21. 
Figure 1-21:  Growth in African CO2 Emissions Since 1960 
 
Source:  ISE original (data from Global Carbon Atlas website) 
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Given the supply-constrained nature of the African electricity sector, as it expands in coming decades to 
meet demand growth, rapid cessation of fossil fuel burn for electricity generation in Africa is unlikely – 
without which, significant declines in CO2 emissions are also unlikely.   
Not only is the quantity of electric generating capacity inadequate in most African countries, but a 
sizable share of installed capacity is often unavailable to produce electricity, because of old age 
compounded by insufficient maintenance.  As an extreme example, according to BloombergNEF, roughly 
half of all the generating capacity in Burkina Faso was off-line in 2017.xxiii  
Thus, most African power generation assets that can operate, do operate.  With minimal operating 
reserves on the grid, when one power plant goes down, the whole grid often does too.  As a result, most 
African nations suffer from high outage rates, during which electricity is not available from the grid, as 
seen in Figure 1-22. 
Figure 1-22:  Availability of Electricity at Grid-Connected Households in African Nations  
 
Source:  Electricity Access in Sub-Saharan Africa, World Bank, 2019 
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Africa’s poor electricity reliability is undoubtedly a major factor in the continent’s lack of economic 
progress relative to other regions, as is suggested by Figure 1-23. 
Figure 1-23:  Electricity Outages and GDP Per Capita in Selected Regions, 2017  
 
Source:  Africa Energy Outlook, IEA, 2019 
As depicted in Figure 1-24, the World Bank estimates that electricity grid outages in Africa impose a cost 
equivalent to a significant fraction of national economic activity. 
Figure 1-24:  Economy-Wide Costs Due to Power Outages in Selected African Nations  
 
Source:  Think Outside the Grid:  Africa’s Trillion Dollar Energy Opportunity, DBL Partners, 2018 
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To compensate for high grid outage rates, many African businesses and households with above-average 
financial means rely on backup power supplies, typically involving diesel generators, solar panels, and/or 
batteries.   
For the most part, official electricity statistics overlook this segment of activity, but by all accounts, self-
produced electricity is a very significant factor in African electricity usage – especially for large industrial 
operations in remote areas (e.g., mining), where isolated grids not connected to the primary national 
grid are often utilized.   
According to the International Finance Corporation (IFC), “the installed capacity of back-up generators is 
greater than the capacity of power plants connected to the grid” in more than half of the countries in 
SSA.  In West Africa, customer-sited generators produce an amount equivalent to about 40% of all 
electricity supplied over the grid, and more is spent on fueling generators than operating and 
maintaining the grid.  Reliance on back-up generators is especially pronounced in Nigeria, where an 
estimated 15-20 GW of backup generators far exceeds grid-connected power plant capacity.  Not only 
are backup generators a major factor in African electricity supply, but also in African fuel consumption, 
accounting for approximately 20% of all diesel/gasoline burned in SSA.  Backup generators are also a 
major contributor to local air and noise pollution in cities and villages across Africa.xxiv 
This extensive degree of customer reliance on backup generators reinforces how significant the grid-
based electricity supply deficit is across Africa.  Expanding the existing base of African electricity 
infrastructure – both grids and generation assets – might gradually displace carbon-intensive and locally-
polluting backup generation.    
However, the effectiveness of building more large-scale generation assets in Africa to supply more 
power will be impeded if there is insufficient interregional integration of the electricity grids that already 
exist. 
Role and Opportunity for Power Pools in Africa 
As the electricity sector developed in other parts of the world during the 20th Century, economic 
efficiencies dictated the creation of grid interconnections to make the most cost-effective use of new 
and increasingly large increments of electric generating capacity additions.  Accordingly, in most 
developed economies, “power pools” were established to link grids and jointly capture economies of 
scale in electricity generation. 
In its formative years, Africa’s electricity sector was developed on a local level, wherein a grid of modest 
extent was constructed to serve a certain city or industrial facility.  Lacking interregional transmission 
ties, power pools were effectively a moot concept for Africa.  It has only been during the past thirty 
years, due to growing regional economic collaborations among African nations, that power pools have 





Figure 1-25:  Power Pools in Africa 
Power Pool Countries Founded in 
Comité Maghrébin de 
l’Electricité (COMELEC) 
Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia 1989 
West African Power Pool 
(WAPP) 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo 
2000 
Central African Power Pool 
(CAPP) 
Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central Africa Republic, 
Chad, Congo, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome 
and Principe 
2003 
Eastern Africa Power Pool 
(EAPP) 
Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Djibouti, 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya Rwanda, South Sudan, 
Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda 
2005 
Southern African Power 
Pool (SAPP) 
Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe 
1995 
 
Source:  African Power Pools:  Regional Energy, National Power, ECDPM, 2019 
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Albeit at different stages of development and with different sets of policies for inter-country commerce, 
the five African power pools were formed primarily to create economic viability for large centralized 
power generation projects (hydroelectric facilities often exceeding a GW), and secondarily to enable 
trading of power across national boundaries when different countries have surpluses and deficits of 
electricity generation.   
In the relatively few years in which they have existed, the power pools have notched some successes in 
joint planning of large-scale generation assets and supporting transmission projects, and in providing 
assistance to member countries on feasibility studies and other steps during the development process. 
Although difficult to quantify, the power pools have improved electricity resilience at the bulk power 
level so that distribution companies and larger commercial/industrial (C&I) customers have somewhat 
better access to regional electricity supplies at lower-cost and higher-reliability than could be achieved 
domestically.  The improved ability for large C&I customers in remote areas (such as mining operations) 
to effectively source power has been of particular benefit to local communities that would otherwise 
not have (at least to date) gained energy access by national utility expansion plans alone. 
Unfortunately, in practice, the five African power pools are unable to offer many of the economic 
advantages of scale in electricity supply as observed in power pools in developed economies such as in 
North America and Europe.  This is because, as discussed previously, there is proportionally less 
opportunity for cross-border trade in electricity in Africa, for two reasons: 
• Most regions are chronically short of generation; any regional generation surpluses are 
infrequent and small 
• International transmission interconnections are weak, often limiting the ability to export power  
In the view of BloombergNEF, the most advanced power pool in Africa is the Southern African Power 
Pool (SAPP), within which RSA’s giant national utility Eskom is the critical player.  Created in 1995, SAPP 
launched a short-term electricity trading platform in 2001, followed by a competitive day-ahead market 
in 2009, and then an intraday market in 2016.  As of 2017, roughly 6 TWh of energy was transacted 
between SAPP counterparties, of which about 14% was via these competitive markets.xxv 
Since they are focused solely on planning and operations of the high-voltage network, the African power 
pools pay limited attention on the lower-voltage activity of electricity distribution, which is the lynchpin 
of residential electricity access.   
For this reason, and because they lack authority to enforce targets if member sovereign nations fail to 
comply, the African power pools have not established electricity expansion goals.  The regional power 
pools and their system planners should theoretically account for nationally-set aspirations when 
developing resource expansion plans.  Even so, it is unclear to what degree energy access is considered 
in planning, as the power pools are generally still young and thus still maturing in their planning 
resources and capabilities.   
Projected Additions to Electricity Supply and Growth in CO2 Emissions 
In its recent analysis of the African energy sector, Africa Energy Outlook 2019, the IEA developed two 
scenarios of future growth: 
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• Stated Policies Scenario (“STEPS”), which reflects projected continuation of “policy frameworks 
and plans” that are currently in place today across Africa. 
• Africa Case Scenario (“AC”), which reflects achievement of the Africa Union’s 2063 Vision 
including (among other things) universal energy access. 
Thus, IEA’s STEPS scenario is effectively a base case representing continuation of the status quo, 
whereas the AC scenario reflects more aggressive pursuit of a greater degree of ambition in African 
electricity sector advancement.  
From a generating capacity standpoint, IEA’s forecasts indicate that installed capacity in 2040 could 
reach 614 GW under the STEPS scenario and 924 GW under the AC scenario, as shown in Figure 1-26.  
This would reflect an addition of 370-680 GW of new power generation from today’s levels, with the 
biggest share of this growth contributed by solar PV.  In addition to dramatic growth from PV, other 
renewables (especially hydro and wind) and natural gas also are projected to experience significant 
increases in capacity, whereas capacity fueled by coal or oil remains effectively constant.   
Figure 1-26:  IEA Projections of Future Growth in African Power Generation Capacity  
 
Source:  Africa Energy Outlook, IEA, 2019 
For comparative purposes, GEIDCO’s recent analysis of future African electricity sector capacity 
expansion (shown in Figure 1-27) is intermediate between the two IEA scenarios, estimating roughly 850 




Figure 1-27:  GEIDCO Projections of Future Growth in African Power Generation Capacity  
 
Source:  Research on African Energy Interconnection, GEIDCO, 2019 
Notwithstanding the increasing share of electricity generation to be provided by renewable energy 
sources, CO2 emissions from the African electricity sector are generally expected to continue to 
increase.   
In IEA’s scenarios, CO2 emissions from the African electricity sector is forecasted to increase by 10-20% 
between now and 2040.  As depicted in Figure 1-28, most of the growth in CO2 emissions can be 
attributed to anticipated expansion in natural gas electricity generation. 




Source:  Africa Energy Outlook, IEA, 2019 
However, it should be noted that IEA’s CO2 emission forecasts reflect the assumption that a significant 
quantity of African coal-fired generation retires during the forecast horizon.  This assumption is 
questionable given how capacity-short the African electricity sector is and will remain for the 
foreseeable future.  If the assumption of declining coal-fired generation turns out to be incorrect, 
through a combination of increased construction and deferred retirements, the rate of growth in African 
electricity CO2 emissions could be somewhat higher than IEA forecasts. 
Generation Mix:  The Swing Factor for Future CO2 Emissions in Africa 
For CO2 emissions from the African electricity sector to remain flat (much less decline), it will be critical 
to ensure that as much new renewable energy infrastructure be introduced as quickly as possible.   
How quickly and to what degree the expansion of renewable energy can be achieved in the African 
electricity sector is an open – and vitally important – question. 
Figure 1-29:  Two Recent Analyses Exhibit Major Differences in Projected Future African Electricity 





Source:  Electricity Access in Sub-Saharan Africa, World Bank, 2019 
With renewable energy alternatives much more cost-effective than they were even a few years ago, 
perspectives on the future mix of generation additions in Africa have been in flux.  To illustrate this, 
Figure 1-29 summarizes two very different forecasts of African electricity generation through 2030 that 
were developed only two years apart (2015 and 2017). 
At the aggregate level, there is good agreement between the two studies shown in Figure 1-29 on the 
absolute amount of electricity generation (1,000 TWh) to be added in Africa by 2030.  However, the first 
analysis indicates that renewables will account for less than 20% of generation by 2030, whereas the 
second analysis suggests a 90% share of generation from renewables by 2030.   Notably, solar and wind 
account for virtually none of 2030 generation in Africa in the first analysis, and roughly two-thirds of 
2030 generation in Africa in the second analysis. 
Clearly, the implications of this difference on the future trajectory of emissions from the African 
electricity sector are enormous. 
In addition to maximizing renewable energy deployment, arguably the most important remaining swing 
factor driving the future trajectory of CO2 emissions from the African electricity sector will be the degree 
of reliance on coal-fired power generation, relative to alternatives. 
Across Africa, there is 48 GW of coal-fired capacity, and RSA is home to 85% of it.  While dominating the 
electricity industry in RSA, coal is otherwise not a significant factor in the electric generating base 
elsewhere in Africa, with only minor contributions in a dozen countries.xxvi  Yet, several other countries 
are now building or planning deployment of their first coal power plants, as seen in Figure 1-30. 
Figure 1-30:  Number of Coal-Fired Power Plants in Selected African Nations (as of July 2019)  
 




It is unclear how many of these new coal plants being planned or constructed will actually come on-line, 
not only because of the challenges in completing major capital projects in Africa (discussed further 
below), but also because of the general global trends against coal-fired electricity. 
In many countries around the world, existing coal power plants are being closed and new coal power 
plants under development are being cancelled at an accelerating rate, due to deteriorating relative 
economics and increased risks of stranding new investments if/as decarbonization policies or mandates 
drive coal-fired generation out of the market.  Indeed, a growing number of financial institutions serving 
the global infrastructure marketplace are ceasing lending activity to new coal projects.xxvii 
Across SSA, over 30 GW of proposed coal-fired additions – mostly in RSA – have already been cancelled 
or shelved in recent years, as shown in Figure 1-31.  
Figure 1-31:  Coal Power Plant Capacity Shelved or Cancelled 
 
Source:  Sub-Saharan Market Outlook 2020, BloombergNEF, 2020 
To monitor future CO2 emissions growth from the African electricity sector, it will be important to see if 
these trends towards closure/cancellation of coal-fired generation continue.  
Since so much of the existing coal generation capacity and coal resource in Africa is based in RSA, it will 
be especially important to track activity there.  As discussed further below, the national utility Eskom 
has recently run into severe financial stress – due in large part to cost overruns and poor performance of 
two large coal power plants in the past decade – which may lead to a major restructuring.  In turn, 
Eskom’s financial challenges may jeopardize plans for new coal capacity construction in RSA, while at the 
same time increasing the possibility that the retirement of the existing RSA coal fleet may be deferred. 
Combining the effects of new construction and closure of existing plants, Figure 1-32 shows recent IEA 
projections for African coal-fired generation peaking sometime before 2030 and declining thereafter, 
reflecting some degree of completion of new projects gradually overtaken by retirements. 
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Figure 1-32:  IEA Projections on African Coal-Fired Generating Capacity and Electricity Generation  
 
Source:  Africa Energy Outlook, IEA, 2019 
Since the African electricity sector is currently capacity-short to a significant degree, it is questionable to 
assume – as the IEA has – that coal-fired capacity is retired and coal-fired generation will decline within 
the next few decades.  Absent plans for a well-managed socially-just transition that replaces lost jobs 
and economic activity, significant forces at work will tend to keep existing coal power plants running.   
In short, economic forces alone are unlikely to drive the retirement of existing coal power generation in 
Africa.  If existing coal-fired capacity in Africa is to decline in the foreseeable future in order to drive CO2 
emissions downwards (notwithstanding the potentially negative effects on electricity supply availability), 
proactive environmental campaigns will likely be required.  
One of the most important determinants of the rate of change in both renewable electricity and coal-
fired electricity in Africa is the degree of expansion in natural gas fired generation across the continent.  
Significant recent natural gas discoveries in SSA portend development and production of these 
resources for electricity generation (and other uses) across Africa.  Discoveries in Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Senegal and Mauritania are estimated at 200 trillion cubic feet (tcf) that, when combined with 
Nigeria’s proven gas reserves of 200 tcf, is thought to be sufficient to supply two-thirds of global gas 
demands for about 20 years.xxviii 
However, increases in natural gas use in the African electricity sector will be limited if financing for 
natural gas pipeline construction is not viable, due to the risk factors discussed in further detail in 
section III.  If meaningful expansion of pipelines does not occur, the only gas-fired generation 
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possibilities for locations without nearby natural gas production will depend upon the development of 
liquified natural gas (LNG) infrastructure.   
As of 2018, SSA countries have the capacity to produce and ship 34 million tonnes per annum (mtpa) of 
LNG – most of which is located in Nigeria.  By 2025, this figure is expected to more than double, mostly 
due to a planned $50 billion investment to create a new 30 mtpa export facility in Mozambique.  On the 
demand side, Ghana is installing 1.7 mtpa of LNG import capability in 2020 to supply 25% of the nation’s 
electric power capacity (in lieu of oil), and Cote d’Ivoire, Morocco and RSA are also evaluating potential 
LNG import investments.xxix 
While the economics of LNG importation have been improving everywhere in the world – especially in 
smaller-scale increments – financing of LNG export or import projects in African nations will, as is the 
case with all other kinds of energy infrastructure, often be challenging. 
$1 Trillion in Capital Investment Requirements  
Translating the African electricity infrastructure expansion need into financial terms, BloombergNEF 
estimates about $245 billion in electrification investment across SSA to occur between 2018 and 2030 
(i.e., about $20 billion per year) if universal energy access is earnestly pursued.  However, this estimate 
appears to be predicated on very minimal levels of energy access, assuming 300 kWh consumption per 
year per household.  As a result, the recent Bloomberg estimate of future investment requirements for 
African electricity system expansion falls on the low side of the spectrum.xxx 
In contrast, McKinsey has estimated that $835 billion of capital investment – over $40 billion per year 
for the next two decades – would be required to satisfy projected 2040 electricity demand levels in SSA 
electricity.  Of this amount, $490 billion (59%) is attributable to generation expansion.xxxi 
Moreover, McKinsey’s estimate of overall capital requirements to expand the African electricity 
infrastructure is generally corroborated by research from:  
• The World Bank, which states that “estimates of annual investments required for the power 
sector between 2015 and 2040 range from $33.4 billion to $63.0 billion.”xxxii 
• AfDB’s Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), which states that an annual 
investment of US$ 42 billion (of which $33 billion for new generation additions) is needed 
through 2040 to meet forecasted electricity demand growth across Africa.xxxiii 
• PBL, which (as shown in Figure 1-33) estimates nearly $1 trillion dollars of electricity investment 






Figure 1-33: Total Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa Electricity Infrastructure, 2010-2030 
 
Source:  Towards Universal Electricity Access in Sub-Saharan Africa, PBL Netherlands 
Environmental Agency, 2017 
Meanwhile, Figure 1-34 shows the IEA’s more recent and comprehensive analysis indicating that the 
investment requirement in electricity infrastructure to achieve full (or near-full) energy access across 
SSA could be on the order of $100 billion per year. 
Figure 1-34:  Average Annual Power Sector Investments in Sub-Saharan Africa Between 2019 and 
2040, Billions of 2018 US Dollars  
 
Source:  Africa Energy Outlook, IEA, 2019 
In either of the two IEA scenarios, Figure 1-35 shows that most of the investment requirement would 
flow to renewables and grid infrastructure, while investments in new capacity additions based on fossil 




Figure 1-35:  Annual Average Power Sector Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa Through 2040  
 
Source:  Africa Energy Outlook, IEA, 2019 
Figure 1-36 provides a table summarizing these estimates, which suggests that minimally $20 billion per 
year – more likely $30-50 billion per year and potentially greater than $100 billion per year – is required 
to expand electricity infrastructure in Africa (mainly in SSA) to significantly improve energy access and 
availability.   
Figure 1-36:  Estimates of Capital Investment Requirements for African Electricity Expansion 
 
Source: ISE original  
Recent investment levels in the African electricity sector appear to be on the low end of this spectrum, 
which in turn may be well above longer-term historical averages.   
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As Figure 1-35 indicates, about $20 billion was invested in SSA on electricity infrastructure:  $4 billion for 
fossil generation, $9 billion for renewable generation and $7 billion for transmission and distribution 
(T&D) networks. 
However, even this degree of investment may be atypically high:  elsewhere, the World Bank estimates 
that $29.8 billion was invested in electricity generation in assets in Africa between 1990 and 2013.xxxiv  
Since generation typically represents around half of the asset base of a comprehensive electricity 
system, this World Bank estimate implies that about $60 billion in total electricity infrastructure 
investment in Africa during this period, which equates to less than $3 billion per year over a prolonged 
span of time. 
Recall further that the estimates presented in Figure 1-36 of capital requirements for African electricity 
infrastructure expansion are based on providing customers newly connected to the grid only relatively 
low degrees of energy access.  If per capita electricity consumption in African nations is to be elevated 
towards developed-world levels, a far greater amount of investment would be required to 
commensurately expand electricity infrastructure. 
Therefore, over the course of the next two to three decades, the aggregate capital requirement for 
expanding African electricity infrastructure is easily on the order of $1 trillion. 
It is important that such large magnitudes of capital be deployed wisely in pursuing an appropriate set of 
infrastructure development opportunities – both to most efficiently bring power and progress to African 
people, and to do so in an environmentally-sound manner.   
Because the installed African generation mix is so heavily dominated by fossil fuels, if the current 
electricity infrastructure is merely expanded from its current state with the generation mix held 
constant, CO2 emissions from the African electricity sector would multiply accordingly.  Simply 
expanding the African electricity infrastructure with “more of the same” is inconsistent with the global 




II:  Alternatives for 21st Century African Electricity Sector Expansion 
 
Development of the installed African electricity infrastructure has generally followed the pathway 
blazed nearly 100 years ago on other continents:  the construction of high-voltage transmission lines 
extending out from urban areas to large power generation facilities located in the countryside, all built 
to provide shared universal electricity service via distribution monopolies (for most African nations, 
usually state-owned).   
Alas, as shown in the previous section, these efforts have not created an electricity system that serves 
Africa well, in turn poorly positioning the continent for the future.  Across most of SSA, energy access 
rates, electricity reliability levels and electricity consumption per capita are amongst the lowest in the 
world, providing a weak platform for economic growth and social advancement. 
For climate reasons alone, building out a pan-African grid to close the energy access gap by following the 
20th Century roadmap for electricity sector development – involving large centralized generation plants 
(typically fossil fuel based, augmented by large hydro) and long-distance transmission to distribution 
networks – would be damaging.  It’s also becoming increasingly doubtful that such a pathway would be 
least-cost. 
Fortunately, there are two promising sets of options for electricity infrastructure expansion that until 
recently had not sufficiently advanced to be economically viable in most circumstances:   
• Centralized renewable energy sources (other than hydro and geothermal), notably solar and 
wind 
• Distributed energy resources (DER) 
These two set of options, blended in region- or country-specific optimal mixes, offer the promise for a 
development path for the African electricity sector that takes fuller advantage of 21st Century 
technologies and business models – producing zero (or near-zero) CO2 emissions and more suitably 
configured for the spatial distribution of population and existing electricity infrastructure in Africa. 
With technical improvements yielding significant cost reductions over the past few decades, these two 
approaches for electricity expansion are now often the most economic, and are usually more 
environmentally sustainable, than traditional electricity infrastructure choices.  With appropriate 
consideration by government authorities, sector planners, and the financial community, Africa may be 
better able to capitalize on these two sets of options than other continents that have already committed 
to infrastructure based on 20th Century paradigms.  
Each of these two emerging pathways for electricity sector expansion is discussed further below. 
Centralized Renewable Energy   
Electricity production based on renewable resources is not a new phenomenon.  Hydroelectric and 
geothermal facilities have long been viewed by utilities and grid operators as just another power 
generation option, albeit with “fuels” that have zero marginal cost and – crucially, as the world aims to 
address climate change – do not produce any emissions.  As such, attractive options for additional large-
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scale hydro and geothermal capacity in Africa are worthy of exploring to help address the continent’s 
pressing needs for new zero-emission electricity supply. 
(Note:  this paper has excluded consideration of biomass energy – another category of renewable 
resources – because they are extremely difficult to characterize in summarized form.  In any event, since 
biomass electricity generation is generally not seen to be a major contributor – present or future – to 
Africa’s electricity sector, this exclusion is not seen to be material to the findings of this paper.)  
Traditional Renewables:  Hydro and Geothermal 
 
In many parts of the world, the first significant electricity generating facilities in many parts of the world 
were renewable:  hydroelectric plants capturing the ability to use the flow of water in rivers as a reliable 
source of kinetic energy.   
In Africa, 35 GW of hydro is already in the generation capacity mix, accounting for 16% of electricity 
production on the continent.xxxv  In 11 African countries, as depicted in Figure 2-1, hydroelectric 
generation represents a majority of the capacity provided by the national power generation fleet. 
Figure 2-1:  Large Hydro As A Share of Total Installed Electric Generating Capacity, 2018 
 
Source:  Sub-Saharan Market Outlook 2020, BloombergNEF, 2020 
Moreover, the installed hydro base represents only 11% of Africa’s theoretical hydro potential, so 
hundreds of gigawatts of untapped hydro development opportunity remains across the continent.  
Reflecting this unrealized potential, 17 GW of additional hydro is now estimated to be under 
construction in Africa.xxxvi 
The scale of hydro resource potential in Africa is so extraordinary that it is tempting to view hydro as an 
all-encompassing solution to most if not all of Africa’s electricity needs.  This temptation must be 
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avoided:  while development of additional large-scale hydro capacity in Africa can be worth pursuing, 
caution is warranted. 
Without appropriate sensitivity to environmental concerns, massive new hydro development in Africa 
would significantly alter the ecology of many large areas of the continent, including the destruction of 
many important ecosystems that are critical contributors to carbon absorption.  Altered ecologies 
trigger massive adaptation as life adjusts to impacts, in turn leading to altered microclimates which 
impact rainfall, temperature changes that alter water balances, and potentially incalculable impacts that 
can generate a protracted period of surprise outcomes with unknowable consequences.   
Moreover, large hydroelectric projects often cause significant social dislocations, uprooting communities 
that are flooded for water collection above dams.  It is for these reasons that the World Bank 
established its Inspection Panel in 1993 to serve as a forum for stakeholders to ensure that their local 
interests are appropriately considered during project development.xxxvii 
Also, Africa is highly vulnerable to changing weather patterns due to climate change.xxxviii  Because of 
this, Africa may be wise to avoid undue reliance on hydropower, given that historical rainfall patterns 
underlying hydroelectric resource projections are under threat if drought conditions worsen.   
In addition, many of the best undeveloped hydro opportunities in Africa are at the gigawatt scale, 
requiring multiple billions of dollars to complete – especially when considering likely investments also 
needed to construct long-distance high-voltage transmission lines that carry large volumes of electricity 
to distant demand sites.  As discussed in Section I, the African electricity transmission system and 
electricity demand levels are generally inadequate to support incremental projects of this scale.   
Even where existing grid assets and customer demands could “fit” a project of this magnitude, it would 
be necessary to coordinate development activities across multiple countries, as the capital requirement 
would far exceed the financing capability of any one nation.   
On top of this, many of these project opportunities are located where extreme country risk is likely to 
inhibit financing.   
To illustrate this litany of challenges facing new large hydro projects, consider two examples: 
• The Grand Inga Hydroelectric Project offers a theoretical capacity of 42 GW located in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).  (Note that 42 GW is equivalent to nearly 20% of the 
currently installed base of electricity generation in all of Africa.)   Rich in natural resources, the 
DRC is nevertheless one of the poorest countries in the world, with very low levels of energy 
access (<10%) and electricity consumption per capita, and virtually no electricity connections to 
other countries.xxxix  Because of these factors, the only viable development plan for Grand Inga 
involved completion in phases.  Accordingly, a nine-phase construction plan was developed, 
with the first phase (351 MW) completed in 1972 and the second phase (1,424 MW) completed 
in 1982.xl  While the first phase of Grand Inga was always envisioned to supply the DRC’s capital 
city, Kinshasa, the second phase was intended to power mining activities farther east – but was 
completed five years before required transmission upgrades, and this delay caused the newly-
constructed dam to deteriorate before it even became operational.  Subsequent phases of 
Grand Inga have since been delayed, although some possibilities for resuming development 
were revived when RSA in 2011 signed an MOU to purchase 2,500 MW of the 4,300 MW 
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planned third phase of Grand Inga.xli  However, given the need for a several-thousand kilometer 
high-voltage transmission line to be built to connect Grand Inga to RSA, as well as the 
deteriorating economic condition of RSA and its national utility Eskom (discussed further below), 
any near-term commencement of further construction at Grand Inga is highly questionable. 
 
• The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Hydroelectric Project has a budget of $4 billion and a 
projected capacity of 6,450 MW.
xliii
xlii   Completion of this project alone would more than double 
Ethiopia’s installed capacity of 4.2 GW.   Alas, international financiers have shied away from 
this project since its announcement in 2011 because the Blue Nile River, which the project 
would dam, supplies 90% of the downstream Nile River through Egypt, and Egypt claims 
hegemonic control over the water resources of the Nile, along which 95% of Egyptians live.xliv  
Due to the political tensions that this project could potentially cause between Ethiopia and 
Egypt, foreign investors have deemed project risks to be too high to provide financing. 
These two examples illustrate some of the issues that arise wherever new large-scale projects – hydro or 
otherwise – are proposed.  While the barriers to deployment are distinctive for each project, there are 
common underlying factors.  Because large-scale hydro facilities can disrupt local and regional 
ecosystems and change the political dynamics between countries, national level policies regarding 
conventional hydro development merit updating.  To the extent that new large hydro projects are 
pursued in Africa, cross-border coordination including joint planning and implementation should be a 
priority. 
As a result, while certainly some amount of new hydro development is likely to occur – and should occur 
– in Africa, it is also the case that most of the massive hydro potential available on the continent will not 
– and likely should not – be developed.  
Like hydro, geothermal energy is a well-proven renewable energy source for electricity generation.  With 
substantial operational experience around the world since the 1970’s, geothermal power stations 
exploit subterranean heat sources to generate steam for electricity production.   
The primary challenge facing those that would seek to pursue new geothermal project development 
opportunities is that there simply aren’t many places in Africa, as elsewhere on the planet, with geologic 
conditions that are conducive to economically viable deployment.   
The East Africa Rift System (EARS) is one such location, transecting through Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, 
Rwanda, Burundi, Zambia, Tanzania, Malawi and Mozambique.  Resulting from the rich geothermal 
resources of the EARS region, nearly 700 MW of geothermal power generation capacity has been 
developed in Kenya.xlv  As additional transmission lines can be built, expansion of geothermal capacity 
can plausibly be developed in Kenya and neighboring countries in the EARS region.  The Geothermal 
Energy Association estimates the theoretical geothermal potential of the EARS region at 15 GW.xlvi  More 
realistically, future geothermal development opportunity in the EARS region is likely to be on the order 
of a few gigawatts at maximum, given that only 700 MW has been developed to date.  
Thus, while selected opportunities may be very attractive and viable to pursue – and should be pursued 
where reasonably possible – neither geothermal nor hydroelectricity are likely to be major factors in 
closing the massive pan-African energy infrastructure gap. 
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New Renewables:  Solar and Wind 
Over the past thirty years, two renewable energy options have surged to the fore and are now receiving 
the most attention:  solar energy and wind energy.   
Until recently, these two technologies were widely considered impractical or inviable for large-scale 
electricity generation, but they have matured well:  owing to significant technological advances, costs 
have fallen by orders of magnitude and conversion efficiencies have improved dramatically.   
As a result of these cost improvements, both types of renewable energy can frequently deliver 
electricity at cost levels competitive to conventional fossil fuel-based production – at least in locations 
where the available solar or wind resource is sufficiently abundant.   
Some of the advantages of solar and wind are the same as those offered by hydro and geothermal:  no 
fuel costs, low operating costs, and zero carbon emissions.   
Arguably as important, solar and wind energy projects offer an advantage that alternatives involving 
hydro nor geothermal – nor fossil fuel (nor nuclear) – usually find difficult to match:  smaller minimum 
increments of economic addition.   
This advantage is important because it enables both investors and consumers to avoid the financial 
swings that often occurred when large-scale generation plants were constructed.   
Historically, fossil and nuclear plants were subject to economies of scale, in which larger plants were 
cheaper to build – on a per-unit basis – than smaller plants.  Accordingly, electricity systems were often 
expanded via capacity additions in larger increments than were truly needed at that moment, in the 
hope that expected future demand growth would soon materialize.  In the meantime, substantial 
financial carrying costs on the surplus capacity were incurred until all of the capacity became “used and 
useful”.  Alas, if demand growth was slower than anticipated, the financial burdens of this arrangement 
could be quite significant. 
Because they do not experience economies of scale, solar and wind energy are not subject to this risk.    
Rather than needing to overbuild and then wait for demand growth, solar or wind projects can be 
expanded incrementally as demand grows.  Maintaining high utilization rates immediately upon project 
completion dramatically reduces financial risks and improves access to capital, by minimizing carrying 
costs.   
Moreover, the flexible scalability of adding solar or wind capacity enables project developers to size the 
asset commensurate with local transmission capabilities.  Put another way, even though per-unit costs 
may be somewhat higher, a small solar or wind development opportunity in Africa need not be 
economically impeded by the need to undertake a long (and expensive) transmission addition or 
upgrade. 
Examining each of these two in turn, beginning with solar:  Figure 2-1 shows the declining cost trajectory 




Figure 2-1:  Declines in Installed Costs of Operating and Proposed PV Projects Recently Developed in 
Africa 
 
Source:  Solar PV in Africa:  Costs and Markets, IRENA, 2016 
Equally importantly to the improving economics of solar energy, Africa is fortunate to be blessed with 
significant solar energy resources.  Most of the continent enjoys more than 300 days of bright sunlight 
and irradiance levels twice the average for Germany, where significant deployment of solar has 
occurred.xlvii   
Figure 2-2 reveals a relatively uniform distribution of sunlight across Africa, with more than 80 per cent 
of Africa’s landscape receiving high ambient insolation levels (> 2,000 kWh per square meter per year), 




Figure 2-2:  Distribution of Solar Energy Potential in Africa  
 
Source:  Atlas of Africa Energy Resources, UNEP, 2017 
It is only in recent years, since the costs of electricity based on photovoltaics (PV) technology have fallen 
sufficiently, that the promise of solar energy in Africa is starting to be realized more extensively.   
Starting from minimal levels a decade previously, installed PV capacity in Africa reached 4.5 GW in 
2018.xlviii   
The combination of improved economics and proven ability to adjust deployment scale to follow 
demand growth has made PV financing substantially more accessible in Africa, thereby reducing capital 
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costs for developers.  As a result, especially where it is sunny (as is widely the case in Africa), PV-based 
projects often can produce electricity at lower lifecycle costs than any other generation technology. 
As a result, substantial long-term growth in envisioned for PV in Africa:  by 2040, the IEA estimates 135-
316 GW of PV capacity – nearly two orders of magnitude more than is installed today.xlix 
Although this degree of market growth appears extreme, such expansion of African PV deployment 
nevertheless is feasible, as theoretical solar electricity generating potential in Africa has been estimated 
as high as 10 terawatts (TW).l  At 10,000 gigawatts (GW), this is far more electric generating capacity 
than can be imagined for Africa’s future needs for the forecastable future. 
Therefore, the constraining factors for PV in Africa will not be availability of solar resources, but rather 
consumer electricity demand, ability to deliver electricity to users, and access to cost-effective capital.   
Turning now to wind:  the effective costs of wind energy are inherently lowest where wind speeds are 
consistently higher.  As shown in Figure 2-4, the best wind resources are found in Northern Africa 
(especially across the Sahara Desert) and the Eastern Horn of Africa.  
Figure 2-4:  Distribution of Wind Energy Potential in Africa  
 
Source:  Atlas of Africa Energy Resources, UNEP, 2017 
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As with solar, wind energy deployment has advanced rapidly around the world because its costs have 
declined dramatically over the past few decades.  Although Africa-specific data is not available, wind 
energy projects worldwide are experiencing a similar downward cost trajectory as solar energy, as 
illustrated in Figure 2-3. 
Figure 2-3:  Declining Levelized Cost of Energy for New Onshore Wind Energy Projects 
 
 
Source:  Levelized Cost of Energy Analysis v13.0, Lazard, 2019 
Consequently, in windy locations, wind is now often economically competitive with fossil-based forms of 
electricity generation.  While solar energy may often be cheaper than wind energy, wind energy is often 
a good complement to solar energy as it can provide generation at times (during the night, on cloudy 
days) when solar energy will otherwise be less available.   
As of 2018, 5.5 GW of wind energy capacity had been installed across Africa, a five-fold increase from 
1.0 GW in 2010.   Going forward, the IEA estimates that wind energy deployment in Africa could grow by 
an order of magnitude, to 50-90 GW by 2040.li  While this degree of growth is impressive, it nevertheless 




Development of new centralized solar and wind projects will tend to utilize the business models and 
practices associated with development of traditional coal-fired or gas-fired power generation options 
that have been built in Africa in recent years.  Depending upon the country’s industry structure and 
regulatory regime, new centralized solar or wind projects will either be undertaken by a public-sector 
owned utility or by a privately-owned company, usually an independent power producer (IPP) under a 
power purchase agreement (PPA) signed with an electric utility or distribution company as counterparty.   
Either way, the financial viability of a large-scale solar or wind project is fundamentally based on pricing 
levels for produced electricity and the creditworthiness of the power purchaser.  As discussed below, 
these issues can often be obstacles in many African nations. 
Another key “buy-side” variable affecting the pace of implementation of centralized renewables across 
Africa is how rigorously nations will enforce the renewable energy deployment targets that they have 
announced, as shown in Figure 2-5. 
Figure 2-5:  Renewable Energy Development Targets in Africa  
 
Source:  Research on African Energy Interconnection, GEIDCO, 2019 
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As Figure 2-6 indicates, progress towards achievement of national renewable energy targets in Africa 
has been uneven. 
Figure 2-6:  Progress Towards 2020 Renewable Energy Targets (as of 2018)  
 
 
Source:  Sub-Saharan Market Outlook 2020, BloombergNEF, 2020 
Note that investors and lenders may drift away from engagement in financing renewable energy 
projects in countries whose governments do not follow through on their deployment policies and goals. 
Although they do offer some clear economic advantages, it must be acknowledged that – unlike power 
generation options based on fossil fuels, hydro or nuclear – both wind and solar energy are intermittent 
forms of electricity supply that cannot produce their full rated output 100% of the time, simply because 
sometimes the sun doesn’t shine and the wind doesn’t blow.   
Consequently, to maintain consistent operations on the grid, wind and solar energy generation capacity 
must be accompanied either by (1) other sources of dispatchable generation (such as hydro or fossil), or 
(2) energy storage.  Fortunately, the costs of energy storage are falling, just as the costs of solar and 
wind energy have fallen in recent decades.  Figure 2-7 shows the substantial decline in costs for lithium-




Figure 2-7:  Declining Costs of Lithium-Ion Battery Packs in Energy Storage Systems 
 
 
Source:  “Low-Cost Batteries Are About to Transform Multiple Industries”, Rob Day, Forbes, Dec. 3, 2019 
As the costs of energy storage continue to decline, wind-storage and solar-storage hybrid deployments 
will become increasingly cost-effective, thus (1) reducing the need to pair fossil generation with wind 
and solar in order to maintain stable grid operations, and (2) making wind-storage and solar-storage 
economically attractive for new generation. 
However, it should be noted that an increasing reliance by the African electricity sector on solar and 
wind, and utilization of energy storage to compensate for intermittency, is likely to require a significant 
upgrade grid operating and control systems.  In developed economies around the world, enhancements 
in predictive analytics and control systems underway to accommodate growing utilization of renewable 
energy.  Because the electricity sector in Africa generally lags global best practices, the required 
upgrades in Africa are likely to be even more significant. 
Distributed Energy Resources 
While centralized wind and solar are relatively new generation options to consider to augment the 
existing African electricity grids, a growing body of evidence points to a fundamentally different 
approach for electricity production and delivery as a superior pathway for closing electricity access gaps 
in many areas – especially in rural locations where the gaps are greatest and the costs of grid expansion 
are the highest. 
As noted previously, the notion of isolated grids serving a very small geographic area is not new.  Many 
mining sites in Africa are so far removed from the primary electricity grid serving urban areas that 
dedicated on-site power plants – mostly fueled by oil or petroleum products such as diesel – were 
constructed when the entire facility was built in order to serve the local industrial load. 
What has changed in recent years is that improvements in materials and manufacturing technologies 
have enabled major cost reductions for so-called distributed energy resources (DER) better suited for 
non-industrial power supply needs.  These include: 
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• Micro-hydro:  small run-of-river devices, with an estimated 26 GW of theoretical development 
potential spread across the SSAliii 
• PV:  ranging from arrays of modules to supply a village to a few modules to supply a building to 
stand-alone devices (e.g., lamp, refrigerator) including embedded PV cells 
• Energy storage:  batteries (traditionally lead-acid, but now more commonly lithium-ion) to 
provide electricity when demand exceeds the ability of generation to meet supply 
These DER technologies share several advantages: 
• The minimum economically viable size is very small (<1 MW)  
• The minimum capital expenditure to initiate deployment is low 
• The need for continuous provision of fossil fuels is eliminated 
• The siting of projects usually presents much fewer challenges 
As a result of these advantages, DER is transforming the basic economics of electricity delivery to rural 
low-density collections of electricity loads, such as the many unelectrified villages across Africa.   
With ongoing cost declines, DER is increasingly becoming a viable option for adding electricity 
generation where the economics have never supported such investments.   
Figure 2-8 provides a conceptual framework to illustrate the economic superiority of DER relative to 
“megaprojects” involving distantly sited generation (whether fossil or renewable) plus the addition of 
transmission and distribution to bring power to new customers not yet served by the grid.   
Figure 2-8:  Comparative Economics:  DER vs. Megaprojects  
 
Source:  ISE original 
As can be seen, the economic advantage of DER stands out where customer density and average 
consumption is low – which is the case in much of Africa.  
The implications of this trend towards DER for a continent with Africa’s innate characteristics are 
potentially enormous.  Rather than requiring wires to be strung across long unpopulated distances with 
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virtually no economic activity along the way to help financially support the costs of the infrastructure 
expansion, DER-based systems can be located close to customer demands, thus reducing capital 
investment and ongoing expenditures on electricity delivery (both transmission and distribution).  For a 
DER-based grid, at least half of the total cost structure is associated with small/modular generation (and 
energy storage) assets, as is reflected in Figure 2-9. 
Figure 2-9:  Decomposition of Typical Solar Mini-Grid Cost Structure 
 
Source:  Power for People, ESMAP 
In most remote villages, where electricity consumption levels will usually be low (especially if starting 
from zero), electricity service is most economically be provided by a DER-based grid.  The scale of a DER-
based system serving a particular geographic area will inevitably be related to the number of households 
within the area and the degree of energy access and the corresponding amount of electricity 
consumption associated with the average household in the area. 
With few exceptions, DER-based grids in Africa are or will be designed to operate autonomously, 
unconnected to the main electricity grid operated by the national utility.   
Note that a country’s national grid is essentially a wide-area network, accommodating generation 
supplied from numerous power plants to supply multiple distribution circuits, each of which serves 
hundreds if not thousands of customers.   
In contrast, DER-based grids are stand-alone systems, frequently called “off-grid systems”, independent 
of the primary grid.  They must have all the essential capabilities of the primary grid – electricity 
generation, balancing of generation with demand levels, delivery.  As a result, DER-based systems are in 
most meaningful ways a very small electric utility.   
However, because the load levels are smaller, the equipment for these DER-based systems does not 
need to be as heavy-duty as the equipment used on a nationwide grid serving gigawatts of electricity 
demand.  Also, DER-based systems avoid all transmission equipment and eliminate many long-distance 
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runs of distribution lines.  Between these two factors, the capital costs of DER-based systems are far 
lower than the typical outlays associated with extending the primary electricity grid.  
Except for the most remote locations, electricity service from DER-based systems is more expensive than 
from centralized grids.  However, significant cost reduction potential has been identified in several 
aspects of DER-based grids, as depicted in Figure 2-10.   
Figure 2-10:  Cost Reduction Potential via Improvements in Mini-Grids  
 
Source: Microgrids in the Money, Rocky Mountain Institute, 2018 
As the kinds of cost reductions presented in Figure 2-10 are realized, DER-based grids will become 
increasingly competitive in an ever-expanding set of circumstances and locations, with per kWh costs 
closer to conventional grid levels.liv 
In most DER-based electricity delivery systems, service to customers is usually offered under a pay-as-
you-go (PAYG) business model.   
Under PAYG, rather than being billed after-the-fact for metered electricity consumption, the customer 
prepays the owner/operator of the DER-based local system for a given number of kilowatt-hours, the 
customer’s meter is set by the owner/operator to enable the consumption of the purchased kilowatt-
hours, and the customer then decides when and how much to use electricity until more electricity units 
are purchased. 





Figure 2-11:  Examples of PAYG Activity Across Africa  
 
 
Source:  Think Outside the Grid:  Africa’s Trillion Dollar Energy Opportunity, DBL Partners, 2018 
Delivering electricity within a building, a village, or a few villages, DER-based systems of increasing scale 
can be classified into three respective categories: 
• Mini-grids serving several villages that are relatively close together 
• Microgrids serving one village consisting of dozens of buildings (i.e., customers) 
• Nano-grids serving one building 
(Note:  this paper excludes a category of off-grid solutions smaller than a nano-grid called “solar home 
systems” (SHS), wherein an individual appliance such as a lantern or refrigerator includes an embedded 
PV power source.  This is because most of these SHS products are designed to operate in a stand-alone 
manner, not to be part of any network.  However, many electrification programs in SSA rely heavily on 
SHS for initial provision of energy access – even though it is very difficult to achieve anything beyond 
“Tier 1” access via SHS, and higher degrees of access will require a leap into at least a nano-grid.) 
 





Mini-grids are localized electricity distribution networks that integrate on the order of 2-20 MW in total 
generation capacity.  Mini-grids typically serve multiple communities that are close enough to each 
other (e.g., within perhaps 10 kilometers) to justify a common distribution network.  A representative 
mini-grid in SSA would consist of a micro-hydro plant and some PV-based capacity (possibly backed up 
by a diesel generator) connected by a set of distribution lines to a handful of communities, including 
small commercial activity (e.g., shops), service businesses, light manufacturing, and households.   
As shown in Figure 2-12, a mini-grid may be the least-cost solution for a regional cluster of moderate-
scale communities that is otherwise remote from the national grid. 
Figure 2-12:  Economic Niche for DER-Based Off-Grid Solutions  
 
 
Source:  ISE original 
As discussed below, a mini-grid can be the end-result of multiple micro-grids becoming integrated to 
exploit synergies.  Accordingly, mini-grids and micro-grids share many operational and commercial 
characteristics. 
Micro-grids 
A micro-grid is technically defined to be a group of interconnected loads and distributed energy 
resources within clearly-defined electrical boundaries that acts as a single controllable entity.lv   In 
practice, a micro-grid provides electricity from a set of generating resources – commonly on the scale of 
0.5-5 MW – to a geographically proximate collection of buildings, such as a village.  A micro-grid is 
usually stand-alone, although with growth may become interconnected with other nearby micro-grids to 
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form a mini-grid, thereby enabling a more robust form of economic dispatch aimed at maximizing the 
utilization of shared generating assets and achieving more reliable electricity service.  
Some African micro-grids were developed decades ago in areas unserved by the national utility, by early 
industrialists who installed diesel generators for electricity supply because the equipment could be 
manufactured at factories (mainly in Europe) and then shipped to Africa ready for deployment.  While 
inexpensive to install and easy to repair/maintain, this decision committed these pioneering microgrid 
users to a constant need and expense for resupplying fuel – not always easy or cheap to recurrently 
deliver to remote locations in rural Africa.   
Now, the declining cost of PV technology has made solar the favored generation supply option of 
present-day micro-grid development activity.   
Nano-grids 
A nano-grid comprises a single building power distribution system with a single domain for voltage, 
price, reliability, quality, and administration.lvi  When multiple buildings equipped with nano-grids 
become connected, a micro-grid emerges. 
The typical size for a nano-grid ranges from 1 - 1000 kW, with the lower end of the range reflecting a 
household and the higher end of the range representing a business customer.  As with micro-grids, 
diesel generators have traditionally served as the main power source for many nano-grids, although this 
is transitioning to solar with the declining costs of PV.  
A complete nano-grid includes the components shown in Figure 2-13:  on-premises power sources, 
energy storage, a set of loads (served via circuits) associated with energy-consuming devices, a system 
controller, and (optionally) a gateway to enable interconnectivity. 
Figure 2-13:  Schematic of a Nano-Grid 
 
Source:  “A Review of Nanogrid Topologies and Technologies, Burmester et al, Renewable and 
Sustainable Energy Reviews, 2017 
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In general, there are two types of nano-grids:  direct current (DC) and alternating current (AC).  DC nano-
grid systems are often preferred for low capacity appliances – such as lighting (usually highly efficient 
LED lighting), phone charging, and storage – due to lower costs, greater simplicity and fewer losses.  
Albeit at higher cost due to the additional  need for an inverter, AC nano-grid systems are favored when 
supplying complex appliances with higher power requirements, including refrigeration and air 
conditioning. 
Summarizing across the three DER-based grid systems considered herein:  mini-grids, micro-grids and 
nano-grids all have the same fundamental characteristics.  Each has a set of resources to generate 
electricity (increasingly augmented with storage resources) and a distribution network and control 
system to manage and deliver electricity to a set of devices that consume electricity.  Each can operate 
autonomously, although they can also be structured to connect to the primary national grid also if 
desired.  The only difference between mini-, micro- and nano-grids is scale:  number of customers, 
magnitude of demand and generation, and geographic range. 
 
“Grid of Grids”: Mix of Centralized and Distributed Renewables 
The preferred sector development strategy for an area with low electricity access – including most 
countries in Africa, especially in SSA – is likely to involve an optimized mix of two archetypes: 
1. Expansion of generation capacity, improvements in generation and grid operational reliability, 
and selective strengthening and expansion of the T&D network and generating capacity in (and 
adjacent to) locations where the primary grid already exists and is salvageable 
2. Deployment of DER-based grid systems elsewhere, and discarding pre-existing plans for adding 
new generating capacity and bringing the distribution grid to populations in vast sparsely 
populated regions 
Although Africa already exhibits a combination of all organizational forms of grid infrastructure, from 
regional power pools spanning multiple countries to small nano- and micro-grids in localized villages, 
most of the historical focus on electricity sector advancement has been along the first dimension 
involving large-scale generation and transmission.  In the future, DER-based grids will likely gain an 
increasing share of activity.   
Over time, with the spreading deployment of small-scale grids, a hybrid state comprised of both larger 
grids and smaller grids will characterize a growing portion of the African landmass.  This hybrid state will 
likely be constantly evolving, with grids attaching to each other in a quilt-like fashion, growing 
organically into a “grid-of-grids” covering much of Africa – assimilating existing grids and their associated 
generation assets.   
As this occurs, admittedly taking decades, a more meaningful degree of electrification can occur in Africa 
with maximum capital efficiency and minimum environmental consequences.  
In this “grid-of-grids”, different types of grids will emerge for different locations across Africa.  According 
to the AREI, 68% of Africans projected to obtain energy access between now and 2030 will do so 
because of investments in centralized grid infrastructure, with the remaining 32% gaining access from 
DER-based grids.lvii   
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Meanwhile, BloombergNEF projects that roughly half of the electrification expansion investments in SSA 
through 2030 will be allocated to DER-based grids.  Assuming African nations seriously aim for universal 
energy access, BloombergNEF anticipates that more Africans would obtain electricity via DER-based 
solutions (137 million) than via conventional grid expansion (92 million).lviii  
This is consistent with IEA’s analysis, shown in Figure 2-14, wherein a greater share of rural African 
population is projected to gain access to electricity via DER-based grids as/if a more ambitious electricity 
infrastructure expansion ambitions are pursued. 
Figure 2-14:  Incremental African Population Served By Alternative Electricity Expansion Modes  
 
Source:  Africa Energy Outlook, IEA, 2019 
Elaborating, it is revealing to compare the share of aggregate capital deployed for centralized (on-grid) 
vs. distributed (mini-grid/stand-alone) assets in SSA under each of the two IEA scenarios.   
Figure 2-15:  Increasing Share of Investments in Off-Grid Electricity  
 
Source:  Africa Energy Outlook, IEA, 2019 
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Figure 2-15 shows that virtually all investment in IEA’s more conservative STEPS scenario is attributable 
to centralized infrastructure, whereas the share of capital going towards distributed grid assets 
increases significantly (to nearly 20%) in the more ambitious AC scenario. 
The finding illuminated in Figure 2-15 implies that, as expansion of the African electricity sector 
transitions beyond the “lowest hanging fruit” – which almost wholly involves centralized grid assets – an 
increasing fraction of activity may turn to distributed assets:  beyond the initial $46.5 billion of annual 
investments identified in IEA’s STEPS scenario, over 30% of the incremental $55.8 billion (up to $102.3 
billion) is attributable to distributed grid assets.lix   
It would be interesting to determine if the “initial” reliance upon investments in centralized assets (as 
suggested by IEA’s STEPS scenario) remains the case when the current economics of alternative energy 
technologies and approaches are considered, or is mainly an artifact of long-planned mega-projects that 
remain in the development queue (which may or may not be brought to fruition). 
Which Africans obtain electricity via DER-based solutions (rather than conventional grid expansion) will 
be a function of both population density and distance away from the current grid, among other factors.  
As the IEA notes, while the least-cost electricity supply solution in Africa will often be the centralized 
grid, the cost of grid extension can be very high for the most remotely-located customers, making other 
DER-based options cheaper for those who are far away from the grid, as shown in Figure 2-16. 
Figure 2-16:  Levelized Cost of Electricity in 2030 for Alternative Approaches to Provide Energy Access 
in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Source:  Africa Energy Outlook, IEA, 2019 
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Note further in Figure 2-17 how geographic distance from the current grid varies dramatically across the 
African continent – and that many places are literally hundreds of kilometers from the grid. 
Figure 2-17:  Distance from the Power Grid on the African Continent, 2010  
 
Source:  Towards Universal Electricity Access in Sub-Saharan Africa, PBL Netherlands Environmental 
Agency, 2017 
Accordingly, many of the more remote areas of Africa will best gain energy access by DER-based mini-
grid or so-called “stand-alone” (i.e., nano-grid or SHS) solutions, as exhibited in Figure 2-18. 
Figure 2-18:  Economically-Optimal Modes of Electrification Across Sub-Saharan Africa 
 




In any given location, the type of grid that should be employed and the associated infrastructure to be 
deployed will best match that area’s particular characteristics:   
• Locations with lower consumption density – typically villages, which tend to be poorer, and 
therefore costlier and riskier to serve – will tend to favor off-grid approaches involving less 
capital-intensive solutions, whereas 
• Locations with lower risks and higher consumption density may justify the greater capital 
outlays associated with centralized generation expansion and associated transmission and 
distribution upgrades 
Moreover, as can be seen in Figure 2-19 from an analysis conducted in Rwanda, locations that never had 
electricity before (and thus more tolerant of lower degrees of electricity availability) will be more well-
suited for DER-based options that can introduce energy access in small and therefore more affordable 
increments. 
Figure 2-19:  Optimal Approach for Electrification in Rwanda Dependent Upon Desired Reliability 
Levels 
 
Source:  Africa Energy Outlook, IEA, 2019 
The most significant initiatives in improving African energy access via DER-based approaches are 
concentrated in four countries:  Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Nigeria.lx  To illustrate: 
• To achieve universal access by 2022, in addition to grid improvements, Kenya is planning 35,000 
new connections through 121 new mini-grids, plus nearly 2 million deployments of standalone 
solar home systems.lxi 




Progress in these countries is enabled by well-defined rural electrification efforts and policies to 
facilitate third-parties to deliver off-grid solutions, leaving other players (including the government) to 
invest heavily in large electricity infrastructure projects – mainly hydroelectric and geothermal power 
generation – to improve availability of electricity supplies for customers in urban and semi-urban areas 
already connected to the grid.   
As sustained economic growth is achieved, the various grids – both large centralized and numerous DER-
based – can organically grow and begin to interconnect, thereby offering improved economies and 
resilience as the investments to make the connections can be afforded.  Slowly but surely, Africa’s 
utilization of local backup generation (especially diesel) to provide electricity during the continent’s 
frequent and extended outages should decline as the lattice of grids interconnect and tighten. 
Common everywhere will be an increasing reliance on renewable electricity generation, both centralized 
and distributed, because of continuing improvements in their economics.  Solar will gain the biggest 
shares, but significant quantities of wind will be added as well – and both will be augmented with 
growing quantities of energy storage to mitigate the otherwise-intermittent nature of both wind and 
solar energy. 
Although new centralized fossil generation opportunities will decline in appeal, it will be difficult to shut 
down existing fossil power plants – though efficiency and availability improvements can and should be 




III.  Impediments to Investing in African Electricity Infrastructure 
 
New approaches to electricity sector development, and to its financing, are necessary for Africa to 
promote economic growth and achieve its energy access ambitions – while also minimizing CO2 
emissions as the world combats climate change. 
The capital that has been invested thus far in African electricity infrastructure has generally performed 
poorly not just in supplying electricity, but also in providing returns commensurate with risks absorbed.   
Financial Insolvency of Most African Utilities    
The World Bank recently studied the financial condition of the electricity sectors in 39 African countries, 
and discovered that most were financially insolvent. 
Figure 3-1:  Comparison of True Supply Costs and Cash Collected for Electricity in African Countries, in 
2014 US $ per kWh  
 
Source:  Making Power Affordable for Africa and Viable for Its Utilities, World Bank, 2016 
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Summarized in Figure 3-1, the World Bank found in 2014 that electric utilities only in two countries – the 
Seychelles and Uganda – were fully recovering their operational and capital costs through revenues 
from customers, and that utilities were covering their operational costs in only 19 countries. Thus, in 18 
countries (approximately half of nations investigated), the electricity sector was financially 
unsustainable:  consuming cash from some external source of subsidization, and returning zero on 
capital investments. 
A prominent example of this phenomenon is Eskom, the state-owned electric utility serving the RSA.   
Until recently, Eskom and RSA were considered among the (if not the) best-in-class across the SSA for 
electricity sector development, and for economic development more generally.  However, the situation 
at Eskom has deteriorated rapidly and dramatically, both financially and operationally.  According to the 
introductory section of an October 2019 overview report of Eskom conducted by an independent 
reviewer: 
“While Eskom is a vertically integrated utility on paper, it has devolved into an operationally 
dysfunctional, financially insolvent, unreliable and corrupt entity…Eskom and South Africa are 
on life support, have no cash [and] no credit…Aggregate debt and liabilities are at least 2.3 times 
the total book assets of the company…There is no asset recovery available to the Company’s 
public or private debt securities, project finance loans and other contractual obligations…The 
Company’s cost of capital, interest maintenance and day-to-day operating cash flow gap have 
overtaken the commercial viability…The Company has no lenders of last resort given the 
disastrous state of affairs…The Company is fundamentally insolvent, permanently impaired, and 
will never be a true going concern enterprise under its current legal, operational and 
governance structure.”lxiii  
To better understand what went wrong at Eskom, the independent review continues: 
“Eskom is in serious trouble at the operational level, leaving aside the massive debt load, lack 
of governance and management, and systematic fraud.  The company has deferred substantial 
maintenance liabilities on its entire fleet of generation, transmission and distribution assets, 
which is crippling the utility….Half of Eskom’s generating capacity (excluding its two new 
stations Medupi and Kusile power plants) is either off-line, severely damaged, compromised, 
lacks spare parts, and won’t be fully operational for another three (3) to five (5) years on a best 
case scenario…The utility is running its operating power plants at a loss and therefore has not 
accrued the necessary maintenance reserves required to operate and maintain the plants.  The 
utility has for lack of better terms, run its aging coal fleet into the ground, causing the overall 
transmission and distribution grids to become more unstable and exponentially increasing the 
risk of complete system failure.”lxiv 
A major cause of many of these issues for Eskom seems to be the 2007 decision to build two new large 
coal-fired power plants, Medupi and Kusile, that have led to significant cost overruns and operational 
difficulties: 
“Construction at the new coal plants Medupi and Kusile has failed miserably, resulting in 
baseload plants constantly tripping off the Grid and have had non-stop design and 
operational/start-up problems…Eskom for no credible reason, decided to have these new 
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multi-billion dollar coal plants custom designed, without going to a “Public Tender Process”, 
and with no credible [EPC] contractor in charge.  This has proven to be costly and devastating 
for the country of South Africa.  The projects have been and are plagued by massive corruption, 
kickbacks and faulty construction.”lxv 
The report on Eskom provides much more detail in this same vein, vividly illustrating the potential 
downsides that can occur when financing African electricity infrastructure development.  
Moreover, it should be noted that Eskom’s cost overruns on major power projects are not unique within 
Africa.  As McKinsey notes:   
 
“Power projects in Africa frequently overrun timelines and budgets; the larger and more 
complex the projects, the greater the overruns. Many international developers already include a 
premium or contingency of 20 to 30 percent for planning timelines (for example, productivity 
rates) and budgets on African projects compared with similar projects in a developed economy. 
But even those contingency amounts often fail to account for the total project expenses we see. 
Currently, a true ‘African cost premium’ would be about 60 percent, in our experience, or 
double what many developers plan for.”lxvi 
 
In addition to reducing costs by eliminating inefficiencies, a clear solution to the current financial 
insolvency of African utilities – and also to the need to attract much more capital to the sector – would 
be to increase electricity prices, which in many cases are subsidized as a matter of national policy.  
However, in practice, it is usually infeasible to raise electricity prices – both economically and politically.  
As discussed previously, low ability to pay (i.e., low purchasing power) and low willingness to pay for 
electricity services by average citizens often effectively preclude electricity price.   
To achieve more positive outcomes in developing the African electricity sector infrastructure for the 21st 
Century, it will be essential that many hundreds of billions of dollars – and quite possibly more than a 
trillion dollars – of capital is attracted to participate.  Absent much more capital, advancements in the 
African electricity sector will simply not happen – and instead more of the same will likely continue to 
occur. 
Central to the question of attracting capital is the fundamental issue of risk.  Each investment 
opportunity must produce the expectation to earn a sufficient return to compensate for the risks 
incurred. 
Of course, there are many dimensions of risk associated with any infrastructure investment opportunity.  
All risks are vital to accurately assess and understand over the asset’s multi-decade lifespan, because 
once deployed, the asset is virtually impossible to relocate to a safe haven if adverse circumstances 
emerge.   
Any investor considering an infrastructure opportunity must assess:  
• The creditworthiness of counterparties that will be responsible for revenue payment on the 
other side of long-term contracts (which, as evidenced in Figure 3-2, is a significant concern in 





Figure 3-2:  Risk of Delayed Payment or Non-Payment by Power Off-taker 
 
Source:  Sub-Saharan Market Outlook 2020, BloombergNEF, 2020 
 
• The risk that demand or competition will not cause the asset to become uncompetitive or 
otherwise forced to reduce price.   
• The possibility that the asset will fail or not work as anticipated for some technical or 
operational reason. 
• The impact that extreme weather and/or natural disasters might wreak upon the asset and 
associated impacts on costs and revenues.   
While the above customary risk factors clearly apply to electricity infrastructure projects anywhere in 
the world, several other risk factors are unique to or especially important in Africa.   
Balkanized African Electricity Markets 
 
As discussed previously, electricity transmission systems in Africa are severely underdeveloped, with 
only a few small interties crossing national boundaries.  Consequently, there is limited potential for 
interregional trade or transfer of electricity, thus foreclosing many generation expansion opportunities 
(e.g., large hydro projects) that might otherwise be very attractive on most other dimensions.  There is 
also little possibility to find an alternative buyer of power if the first buyer reneges. 
With selected exceptions, an electricity sector architecture founded on centralized generation and long-
distance transmission projects is not well-suited to the daunting realities of the African continent.  To 
illustrate, consider the high-priority energy infrastructure projects shown on Figure 3-3 targeting a 2020 
completion date (with an anticipated $50 billion in aggregate capital requirement) in the African 




Figure 3-3:  PIDA High-Priority Energy Infrastructure Projects From 2011  
 
Source:  The PIDA Energy Vision, PIDA, 2011 
Of the 316 PIDA projects targeted in 2011 for completion by 2020, just 50% of them had matured to the 
point of financial close by 2018, and only 18% (57) were operational.lxvii  Clearly, the majority of these 
PIDA projects will not be completed on time, despite their priority status.  In fact, many won’t even be 
attempted. 
The risks associated with projects such as these are large and not easily hedged – and often grossly 
underestimated by investors accustomed to funding similar projects for many previous decades in more 
well-developed nations where a large capital asset can be absorbed into the domestic economy in case 
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trade is precluded for some reason.  Ineffective multinational coordination and planning is thus a major 
impediment to investment in African electricity megaprojects.   
As a result, ambitious infrastructure plans in Africa often don’t come to fruition, or at least are severely 
delayed or scaled-back.  GEIDCO’s vision (presented in Figure 3-4) for a pan-African interconnected 
electricity network by 2050 is clearly subject to these risks. 
Figure 3-4:  GEIDCO Vision for Pan-African Electricity Grid by 2050  
 
Source:  Research on African Energy Interconnection, GEIDCO, 2019 
Conversely, an electricity system architecture premised on DER – involving building-blocks of small-scale 
grids (e.g., nano-grids, micro-grids, mini-grids), usually powered by a combination of solar energy and 
energy storage – is much less subject to these risks.  Therefore, investment opportunities of this type are 
much more likely to be financeable and consequently more suitable for deployment in many parts of 
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Africa.  In contrast to large generation and transmission investment opportunities, DER-based projects 
are much less inhibited by the lack of electricity network integration across Africa.   
Constraints on Private Sector Participation in Electricity 
Over the past 30 years, privately-owned and financed independent power producers (IPPs) have 
emerged as a competitive alternative to regulated (private or state-owned) monopoly utilities for the 
development and operation of new centralized power generation capacity (both fossil and renewable) in 
many countries around the world.  Where IPPs are a major force in the energy sector, it is possible for 
investors to participate without having to deal directly with governmental authorities. 
Alas, this is generally not the case in Africa.  As of 2016, IPPs are a part of the electricity sector in only 18 
countries in SSA.lxviii  As noted in Figure 3-5, Uganda has the most IPP activity.   
Figure 3-5:  IPP Activity in Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding the Republic of South Africa)  
 
Source:  Sub-Saharan Market Outlook 2020, BloombergNEF, 2020 
Installed IPP capacity in SSA totals 6.8 GW (or only about 5%) of installed electricity generating 
capacity.lxix  Figure 3-4 also shows that about half of the IPP capacity in SSA is gas-fired, with renewables 
representing about 30%.  
The relatively low degree of IPP penetration in Africa results from the fact that, in many African 




Figure 3-6:  Ownership Eligibility for Electricity Infrastructure in African Countries  
 
Source:  “Trends and Forecasts for Africa’s Grid-Connected PV Markets”, Wood MacKenzie, 2019 
Avoiding these ownership restrictions on centralized electricity generation assets, a growing number of 
entrepreneurial private-sector enterprises focusing on DER opportunities have begun to fill the voids in 
the African electricity sector.  Most of these new entrants are focusing on bringing solutions to rural as-
yet unserved customers, so that they need not coordinate with the incumbent utility, and they interface 
at a much lower level of involvement with governmental authorities. 
Numerous Country-Specific Risks 
In addition to electricity industry regulatory requirements, there are several dimensions of risk relevant 
to infrastructure development that are country-specific but expand far beyond the electricity sector – 
and on most of these dimensions, African countries unfortunately tend to perform poorly: 
• Political:  Especially for infrastructure assets, investors want a stable government under which 
long-term investments can be made with confidence.  If there is a realistic sense that the 
government might “nationalize” (i.e., take over) privately-owned assets of strategic interest to 
the country, such as might occur with electricity infrastructure in the result of a coup or sudden 
change in power, investment is unlikely.  In comparison with other developing regions of the 
world (such as Latin America), nationalization thankfully has only very rarely occurred in Africa, 
but this possibility (however remote) is generally attached to any infrastructure investment 
opportunity in countries where political systems are considered unstable. 
 
• Regulatory/legal:  Where governments and political forces are in flux – whether there be 
separatist movements or weakening dictators – it is usually the case that the underlying 
regulatory and legal structures will also be unstable.  In the case of immovable and illiquid 
electricity infrastructure assets, prospective investors must gain assurances that key contractual 
terms (especially pricing) and other “rules of the game” will not be adversely changed on a 
whim.  Moreover, some countries have better policies and institutional environments for 
promoting electricity advancement.  As seen in Figure 3-7, the regulatory frameworks in most 
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African nations are less conducive for renewable energy development than elsewhere. 
 
Figure 3-7:  Low Conduciveness of Regulatory Frameworks for Renewable Energy in Africa  
 
 
Source:  Bright Perspectives for Solar Power in Africa?, Institut Montaigne, 2020 
 
Within Africa, Figure 3-8 presents the top countries in BloombergNEF’s most recent global 
Climatescope survey of regulatory policies favorable to electricity sector advancement. 
 
Figure 3-8:  Top Rated African Countries for Progressive Regulatory Policies Conducive to 
Electricity Sector Advancement 
 




• Conflict:   Investors generally don’t want to do business where there are wars or tribal conflicts 
being waged.  In addition to the obvious concerns about personal safety, electricity assets can 
be destroyed for strategic reasons (if not purely out of spite), and operations can easily be 
disrupted – thereby increasing the risks and costs of doing business.  Alas, as seen in Figure 3-9, 
much of Africa is ridden with conflicts.   
 
Figure 3-9:  Active-State Based Conflicts in 2018 
 
Source:  Uppsala Conflict Data Program website 
 
• Currency:     Many of the 41 African currencies in circulation are illiquid and rarely employed in 
international capital-intensive transactions because of the poor state of their underlying 
economies.  For those few currencies that are traded with significant volume in global financial 
markets, they exhibit much higher volatility compared to other currencies.  For example, the 
South African Rand was recently rated by Bloomberg as the most volatile currency in the world, 
even though RSA is generally viewed to be one of the wealthiest and most developed countries 
in Africa.lxx  Currency illiquidity and volatility of this degree significantly impede the ability to 
conduct trade and investment.  In the case of electricity assets, most equipment (and fuel) 
purchases are denominated either in US dollars or Euros, thus limiting currency risk.  However, 
since electricity pricing is usually conducted in local currency, revenues associated with 
investment in African electricity infrastructure are often subject to currency fluctuations that are 
difficult to hedge, and may cause significant financial imbalances relative to cost structure. 
 
• Corruption:  Investors shun places where corruption is rife.  Bribery is illegal for US citizens (e.g., 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) and citizens in many countries – and these anti-corruption 
laws effectively foreclose many sources of capital from participating where bribes are an 
expected business practice.  Unfortunately, as shown in Figure 3-10, a disproportionate share of 








Source:  Transparency International website 
 
As Figure 3-11 indicates, the global IPP community almost universally sees this disparate set of political, 
legal and regulatory risks and counterparty/credit risks to be a major concern impeding African 
electricity sector investment and development. 
 
Figure 3-11:  Survey Response Frequency of Most Important Risks As Perceived by IPPs 
 
Source:  A New Instrument to Foster Large-Scale Renewable Energy Development and Private Investment 
in Africa, RES4Med&Africa 
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It should be re-emphasized that all these dimensions of risk exist for infrastructure projects everywhere 
in the world.  However, few places on Earth exhibit these risks to such a high degree as they do in Africa.  
This makes financing energy infrastructure projects in Africa extremely challenging – even though the 
needs and the opportunities are so great. 
The global infrastructure investment community, and especially participants on the debt side of capital 
markets, spend considerable time and attention weighing country risks such as those listed above.  To 
help standardize investment decision-making across opportunities, several firms in the financial world 
develop country-specific indices that distill the various risks into a simple metric.   
For example, the ratings agency Fitch recently assessed risk-reward potential for power project 
development in many countries, and declared SSA “the region with the worst overall Risk profile.”  
Figure 3-12 indicates not only how the SSA countries compare to each other in terms of risks and 
rewards, but also how they compare to the rest of the world. 
Figure 3-12:  Most Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa Are Perceived to Have High Risks and Offer 
Investors Below Average Returns 
 
Source:  Sub-Saharan Africa Power RRI:  Namibia Climbs Rankings with Renewables Focus, Fitch 
Solutions, 2019 
Figure 3-12 is to be interpreted such that countries in the upper right-hand quadrant represent more 
attractive markets in which to consider investing, whereas countries in the lower left-hand quadrant 
represent less attractive destinations for investment.  However, even South Africa – the country that 
Fitch rates as the best performing in SSA – is barely above the world average benchmark (defined as 
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Rewards = 50, Risks = 50), while the SSA regional average is slightly less rewarding and yet significantly 
riskier than the world average. 
Mitigating Risks Via DER 
To mitigate the full spectrum of the above-listed risks as best as possible, selection of electricity access 
modes needs to closely match local risk profiles.  No one single modality of electricity infrastructure will 
work best for all regions.  Across Africa but especially in SSA, a combination of all types of grid systems 
will likely emerge, from large regional power pools to different scales of distributed systems, even down 
to a single household unit.  
However, as noted throughout the above discussion, DER-based options often imply a lower risk profile 
than centralized grid asset opportunities. 
Since the typical size of the capital outlay is much smaller, the magnitude of risks inherent in DER-based 
investment opportunities is also much smaller than is the case for large-scale generation and 
transmission projects.  In addition, because of its intrinsically more modular nature, DER-based 
opportunities are easier to stage in phases.  In turn, this implies that construction can be halted if 
necessary to respond to adverse developments, without completely impairing the ability to generate 
revenues and cash flows. 
Notwithstanding these advantages, the true risks associated with DER-based opportunities nevertheless 
are prone to being substantially overestimated by potential investors who are unfamiliar with the 
associated technologies and business models, which still remain somewhat novel relative to the 
centralized grid equipment utilized extensively over the past 100 years.   
Moreover, many financial institutions are accustomed to processing capital in larger volumes, and 
instead see disincentives in working with smaller-scale investment opportunities such as those offered 
by DER.  In large organizations with extensive bureaucracies relying upon standardized processes and 
procedures, it is often approximately as costly to evaluate and support a $1 million investment 
opportunity as a $1 billion investment opportunity.  For DER-based grid projects to overcome this 
disadvantage, it is likely that they will need to be bundled into a larger package for financing – which, as 
a side benefit, will reduce investment risks via pooling effects. 
It is therefore important that financial institutions that fund African electricity infrastructure 
investments adopt risk-assessment and quantification practices that more accurately characterize both 
DER and conventional electricity opportunities.   
While increasing DER deployment indicates that financial institutions are becoming more familiar with 
DER’s true risk profiles, it is likely that the structural biases against DER persist.  For Africa’s electricity 





IV:  Institutional Efforts to Advance African Electricity 
 
As is typically the case around the world, electricity service in African nations is generally the 
responsibility of the country’s electric utility or utilities.  And, as is also the case worldwide, 
governments also play a large role in national electricity sectors.   
Many African governments have developed electricity sector “master plans”, with a heavy emphasis on 
increasing energy access and use of renewable energy sources.  Though many of these plans do not 
provide much detail on implementation strategies, nor the magnitudes and sources of capital 
requirements to fund implementation, some countries seem to be making more progress than others on 
electricity sector advancement.   
Perhaps the most notable of all is Kenya, which has experienced the greatest progress in expanding 
energy access over the past decade, with the aim of providing universal electricity access to all Kenyans 
by 2022.lxxi   
Other African countries that have set goals to expand electricity access include: 
• Ethiopia (100% by 2025)lxxii 
• Ghana (100% by 2025)lxxiii 
• Rwanda (100% by 2024)lxxiv  
• Nigeria (90% by 2030)lxxv  
• Tanzania (75% by 2033)lxxvi  
However, as discussed in the prior section of this paper, the high degrees of risk on all relevant 
dimensions and poor state of virtually every important metric of electricity sector performance across 
much of Africa (and across almost all of SSA) make clear that electric utilities and governmental agencies 
in most African countries have generally not been up to the task on their own.   
Accordingly, a growing number of institutions, both within Africa and at the global level, have launched 
initiatives to advance electricity infrastructure development in Africa to help stimulate sustainable 
growth – both for the electricity sector itself and more broadly for overall economic activity.   
African Institutions 
• The African Union (AU).  The AU was launched in 1963 to secure the sovereignty of newly 
independent African nations and the African continent as a united body, thereby helping 
accelerate economic development across the continent.  Early stages of AU implementation 
oversaw the formation of regional economic communities, which have since spawned five 
power pools spanning the continent, as discussed above.  Subsequently, the Pan-African 
Parliament (PAP) of the AU has authorized several energy policies and laws passed that oversee 
cross-border energy trade and standardization of infrastructure for improved efficiency.  Within 
the past decade, the AU has issued a 50-year comprehensive action plan in anticipation of its 
centennial that includes electrification as part of its vision for sustainable and equitable 




• The African Energy Commission (AFREC).  In 2008, the AU launched AFREC, which was given the 
responsibility for overseeing policies, strategies and research for continent-wide integrated 
resource planning of electricity infrastructure.  To date, AFREC has primarily organized capacity-
building initiatives to enhance the efficiency of operations in the electricity sectors of member 
states. 
 
• The African Development Bank (AfDB).  The AfDB has been the main source of “local” financing 
for development projects across Africa.  In addition to sourcing capital from international 
development funds (e.g., the World Bank) that invest in African countries, the AfDB coordinates 
feasibility studies on new projects and serves as a local source of knowledge and confidence, 
thereby facilitating other international investors to deploy capital into riskier territories.  In 
2016, the AfDB launched the New Deal on Energy for Africa, with the objective of catalyzing 
financing of efforts to achieve universal electricity access on the continent by 2025, including  
the following specific goals:  (1) 160 GW new capacity of on-grid generation, (2) 205 million new 
connections (130 million via on-grid and 75 million via off-grid), and (3) 150 million households 
gaining access to clean cooking energylxxviii
lxxix
lxxxi
  Between 2016 and 2020, the AfDB committed to 
invest about $12 billion and leverage up to $50 billion in co-financing for energy projects.  The 
AfDB has also allocated $25 billion towards climate finance from 2020-2025 with its Desert to 
Power initiative, which aims to mobilize funds towards deploying 10 GW of solar energy by 2025 
across the Sahel region to supply electricity to 250 million people.lxxx  Relative to these goals, 
actual progress in deploying capital has been more limited:  from 2014 through 2017, the AfDB 
approved an average of $407 million per year for energy access.    
 
• The Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI).  AREI was launched at COP21 in Paris in late 2015 
under the mandate of the AU to accelerate and scale up the exploitation of the abundant 
renewable energy resources in Africa, thereby leapfrogging fossil-based energy generation to 
the maximum extent practicable.  AREI set an initial target of adding 10 GW of new capacity 
across the continent by 2020 and an additional 300 GW by 2030, with the goal of providing 
universal access to renewable energy.lxxxii  AREI has access to $10 billion in funding for Phase 1 of 
its efforts (ending 2020), which is being administered by the AfDB as an Open Access Global 
Fund under its Power, Energy, Climate Change and Green Growth Complex.  
 
• The Africa Centre for Energy Policy (ACEP).  ACEP is an energy policy think-tank which works to 
harness the potential of Africa’s energy resources (oil, gas and renewable) for accelerated 
economic and social development.  ACEP aims to influence energy sector policies in Africa by 
providing analysis of energy policy, training, advisory services and policy advocacy for the 
efficient and transparent management of Africa’s energy resources.  Notwithstanding the 
organization’s name and its continent-wide ambitions, ACEP appears to focus most of its efforts 




International Intra-Governmental Organizations  
• The United Nations (UN).  In 2016, the UN established 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
incorporated in its 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.  The 7
lxxxiii
th Goal of the SDGs (SDG7) 
aims to ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services by 2030.  To 
help Africa achieve this energy access goal, the UN has committed to invest $20 billion through 
the AfDB and mobilize $80 billion in additional resources through public and private 
partnerships.  The UN also seeks to invest in small- and medium-scale rural electrification 
efforts through mechanisms such as the Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa (SEFA), which has 
sponsored the Africa Renewable Energy Fund (AREF), a pan-African private equity fund managed 
by Berkeley Energy. 
 
• Sustainable Energy for All (SE4All):  An initiative launched under the auspices of the UN, SE4All is 
a global initiative that facilitates market-creating initiatives to address energy access gaps 
through commercial approaches driven more by market economics than by subsidies.  SE4All 
also advocates for governments and stakeholders to reach areas where commercial enterprises 
are unable to operate economically. SE4All focuses its efforts in the 20 high-impact countries 
(HICs) that account for 80% of the global energy gap, and 15 of these 20 HICs are in Africa.lxxxiv
lxxxv
  
Under its geographically focused Electricity for All in Africa initiative, SE4All focuses on policy 
reform, investment promotion and private sector engagement.    
 
• The World Bank Group.  The World Bank is arguably the most important player in energy 
infrastructure finance for assets in developing economies around the world.  Between 2014 and 
2018, the World Bank provided more than $11.5 billion in finance to renewable energy and 
energy efficiency initiatives worldwide.lxxxvi
lxxxvii
  Beyond project finance, some of the development-
assistance initiatives undertaken by the World Bank include the Energy Sector Management 
Assistance Program (ESMAP), within which is housed the African Renewable Energy Access 
Program, funded by a $29 million grant commitment from the Netherlands.  
 
• The International Finance Corporation (IFC).  As a member of the World Bank Group, the IFC 
aims to promote private sector investment in developing countries.  Over the past six decades, 
IFC has leveraged $2.6 billion of its own capital to deliver more than $285 billion in financing for 
business and opportunities worldwide.  In SSA, IFC and its partners have financed over 2.5 GW 
of generation capacity (including 1 GW of renewable and energy-efficient generation) since 
fiscal year 2005.lxxxviii  
 
• Lighting Africa:  Lighting Africa is an initiative by the World Bank and the IFC to act as a market 
catalyst for deploying off-grid lighting systems across Africa and developing solar lighting 
standards for African governments. The impact of Lighting Africa has been experienced by 32 
million people who have gained basic lighting needs. 
 
• Power Africa. Power Africa is an initiative launched by the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) in 2013 with the aim of installing 60 million new electricity connections 
and bringing 30 GW of new and cleaner power generation online across Africa (notably, lacking 
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any specific target date).lxxxix  With on-the-ground resources to strengthen local institutional 
capabilities and de-risk power generation and transmission project opportunities, Power Africa 
employs a transaction-centered approach to addressing the bottlenecks in project development 
and investment in the energy sector, thereby facilitating greater investment and success.  
 
• The International Energy Agency (IEA).  As an information agency funded by OECD countries, the 
IEA provides one of the best integrative sources of data and analysis on the status of the African 
energy sector by country.  In particular, the IEA recently released a detailed report on the status 
and prospects for energy in Africa, Africa Energy Outlook 2019, which has been cited extensively 
throughout this paper.   
 
• The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA).  Since its formation in 2011, IRENA’s work 
within Africa has mainly been oriented to boost technical capacity and create conducive 
investment conditions for renewables, including the development of Renewables Readiness 
Assessments (RRAs) for countries to assess their readiness to develop and deploy renewable 
energy.xc   More specifically, IRENA has been working on regional initiatives such as the Africa 
Clean Energy Corridor, which aims to accelerate the development of renewable energy potential 
and cross-border renewable energy trade within the Eastern Africa Power Pool (EAPP) and the 
Southern African Power Pool (SAPP), while IRENA’s West African Clean Energy Corridor aims to 
support the creation of a regional power market to operate in the Western African Power Pool 
(WAPP).  
 
• The Global Commission to End Energy Poverty (GCEEP).  The GCEEP is an initiative by the 
Rockefeller Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Energy Initiative (MITEI) 
to define a viable pathway for providing electricity services to underserved households and 
businesses worldwide.  Launched in September 2019, the Commission includes members such 
as the President of the AfDB, members from the International Renewable Energy Agency, IEA, 
GOGLA, Power Africa, and several other institutions and organizations.  Although the GCEEP’s 
Inception Report acknowledged various bottlenecks spanning the entire electricity value chain in 
developing countries, the GCEEP identified electricity distribution as the key priority, and 
consequently developed an Integrative Distribution Framework designed to produce inclusive, 
permanent and diverse electrification approaches necessary for viably bringing energy access to 
those who don’t currently have it.xci 
Chinese International Finance Institutions 
• The Export-Import Bank of China (China Ex-Im Bank). The China Ex-Im Bank is an agent for 
executing the international economic policies of the Chinese government. Over the past couple 
decades, Chinese investment into African economies has significantly increased through 
bilateral trade, as well as both public and private economic activities. From 2000 through 2018, 
the China Ex-Im Bank has invested over $25 billion in energy infrastructure in Africa, covering 
electricity generation, electricity delivery (both transmission and distribution), oil & gas 




• China Development Bank (CDB).  The CDB provides medium- to long-term financing facilities for 
infrastructure projects worldwide that serve China’s major long-term economic and social 
development strategies.  In Africa, the CDB has provided over $14 billion in capital for energy 
development since 2000.xciii 
Dedicated Non-Profit Organizations 
• Energy4Impact.  Energy4Impact is a UK-based non-profit organization that offers advisory and 
consultancy services both to the supply and demand side of the value chain in addressing the 
energy access problem in Africa.  To date, Energy4Impact has supported 4,800 businesses to 
provide 17 million people with energy access and raise $136 million through grants, equity and 
debt finance.xciv  
 
• Energy for Growth Hub:  An initiative of the non-profit Center for Global Development, the 
Energy for Growth Hub aims to address the challenge of 3 billion people living in economies 
lacking energy to power commercial and industrial (C&I) growth.  Energy for Growth Hub 
believes primary domestic (i.e., household) access to electricity is necessary but insufficient to 
build competitive economies that sustainably address poverty.  Therefore, Energy for Growth 
Hub is working with experts, global policymakers and African government institutions to share 
data and analyses necessary to scale climate-friendly C&I energy supply. 
 
• The Africa Minigrid Developers Association (AMDA).  Historically, minigrid developers across 
Africa exerted uncoordinated efforts to advocate for policies that favor their operations.  AMDA 
is the first dedicated trade association of minigrid developers focused on sub-Saharan African 
emerging markets.  Through AMDA, minigrid developers influence policymakers to design 
policies that advance deployments of privately-owned minigrids. 
 
• The Global Off-Grid Lighting Association (GOGLA). GOGLA serves as an independent, not-for-
profit global trade association for the off-grid solar energy industry, with the aim of advancing 
its member company interests in building sustainable markets for bridging the last mile of 
electricity access typically unserved by grid electricity. The activities of the association include 
market intelligence, knowledge sharing, networking, advocacy for policy and investment and 
promotion of industry standards.xcv 
As is evident, this is a highly populated landscape of stakeholders seeking to help advance the African 
electricity sector.  Several of these parties – World Bank, AfDB, IFC, UN, AREI, CDB, China Ex-Im Bank – 
can access significant quantities of committed capital to play a direct role in participating in the finance 
of infrastructure projects. 
(Note that some of these institutions invest in projects through other organizations that are also listed 
above.  Thus, adding the investment magnitudes presented herein would lead to double-counting and 
hence overstate total investment in African electricity infrastructure.) 
 
Meanwhile, the remaining institutions (with their more limited budgets) act mostly with the aim of 




Even with the many non-profit initiatives to advance the African electricity sector listed above, the 
discussion in section I of this paper indicates that aggregate capital investment remains insufficient to 
achieve universal energy access, much less provide high levels of electricity supply across Africa at 




V:  Conclusions and Recommendations for Future Research 
 
Based on this research, several observations relevant to the future development of the African 
electricity sector become clear: 
It Is Neither Possible Nor Prudent to Think About the African Electricity Sector Monolithically 
• In general, the electricity sector in North Africa is on par with many developed regions of the 
world.  However, south of the Sahara Desert, in SSA, the situation is dramatically different:  the 
electricity sector in most countries is in dire condition.  Even in RSA, where the electricity sector 
is relatively well-developed, the crisis facing the national utility Eskom is severe, and the nation’s 
economic and energy situation may deteriorate before it begins to improve again. 
   
• Because the situation in each country and region is so different, pan-African conclusions 
typically must be limited to generalities.  (In its recent Africa Energy Outlook 2019 report, the 
IEA recognized this reality, and conducted “deep-dive” analyses on 11 SSA countries.)  High-
impact work to advance electricity in Africa is therefore more likely to emerge from the 
“bottom-up” rather than via a “top-down” approach.   
 
• There is not, and indeed there cannot be, a one-size-fits-all conclusion or solution for optimally 
building out the African electricity sector.  Africa’s heterogeneity cannot be overstated or 
underestimated.  The only common attribute across the SSA region is that electricity sector 
performance is inadequate.  How the electricity sector should best be improved will inevitably 
vary dramatically across Africa. 
 
• Due to limited data availability and quality, it is challenging to undertake robust analyses of 
many topics related to African electricity sector advancement.  While this statement is true at a 
continental-level, it is especially true for many countries (or subnational regions) across Africa.  
Accordingly, gathering and improvement of locally relevant data should be a high priority as a 
precursor to any individual initiative for advancing electricity in Africa. 
 
• Given the paucity of strong national institutions across the continent, those working to advance 
the African electricity sector are more likely to find localized subnational areas than 
multinational or even nationwide opportunities where positive impact can be achieved.  
Future African Electricity Infrastructure Must Look Different Than Today’s 
• Whereas the African electricity sector is currently mostly supplied by fossil fuels, renewable 
energy will represent an ever-increasing share of future growth in capacity.  Certainly, some 
amount of this will be traditional hydro, but wind and (especially) solar deployment will grow 
rapidly from currently modest levels of installation.   
 
• As the African electricity sector becomes more reliant on renewable energy sources for 
generation, there will be significant need for investment both in energy storage assets and in 
improved grid controls to manage intermittency of supplies.  Grid reliability is already poor in 
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Africa, and would further deteriorate if significant additions of solar and wind energy projects 
were made without matching commitments to upgrade transmission and distribution network 
flexibility. 
 
• A mix of off-grid DER and centralized grid infrastructure is likely to be the best approach for 
increasing electricity access across Africa in the most economically viable and environmentally 
sustainable manner.  As a rule of thumb, additions to the centralized grid make sense where the 
grid currently exists (and is in relatively good shape) to serve urbanized areas with above-
average population density.  In contrast, DER-based off-grid systems will be the best option 
where the grid does not currently exist and where population density is low.  The “break-point” 
between the two alternatives – the level of population density such that grid 
expansion/extension and new microgrid development are approximately equally viable – will be 
highly situation-specific.  As a result, as suggested by Figure 5-1, both the average size of new 
capacity additions and share of new capacity provided by fossil fuel in the African electricity 
sector will revert back to its earliest days – except it won’t be just small hydro that dominates, 
but rather PV as the primary renewable resource. 
 
Figure 5-1:  After Decades of Increasing Scale and Fossil Intensity, African Electricity 
Generation Becoming Smaller and More Renewable  
 
Source:  ISE original 
 
• Three major trends that must be accounted for when evaluating improvement opportunities in 
Africa’s electricity sector are (1) population growth, (2) growth in purchasing power, and (3) 
rural-to-urban migration.  The geographic distribution of population density and economic 
activity for Africa in 2050 will likely look very different in many places than is the case today, and 
it is therefore important to promote electricity infrastructure development that is well-suited 




Investment Requirements Are Massive, But Risks Will Inhibit Capital Attraction 
• Under almost any imaginable scenario, because already-large deficits in electricity supply will be 
exacerbated by expected population growth, the need for investment in additional electricity 
sector infrastructure across Africa is immense:  on the order of $1 trillion in aggregate.  On an 
annual basis, the investment requirement is at least $20 billion per year, and perhaps as much 
as $100 billion per year.  In contrast, the amount of capital that is currently being directed to the 
sector is no more than $20 billion per year. 
   
• The primary limiting factor for investments in African electricity infrastructure is the availability 
of financeable projects.  The sector is supply-constrained because few infrastructure 
opportunities are viable based on revenue streams under prevailing conditions (both 
pricing/tariff levels and volumes of electricity) and consistency of cash flows from creditworthy 
in-country counterparties.  Low levels of economic activity (e.g., GDP per capita) and high levels 
of perceived (and in many cases, actual) country risk are major inhibitors to attracting 
investment capital, even if relatively high rates of return are projected.  
 
• When the full spectrum of risks that apply to most places in Africa are properly considered, 
large-scale electricity infrastructure projects – powerplants larger than 100 MW, long-distance 
transmission – will increasingly be deemed too risky for the returns that they can offer, 
especially given the capital-intensity of such projects.  Meanwhile, DER-based small-grids with 
smaller capital requirements will increasingly be recognized as offering superior return 
prospects for their associated risk profile.  This will cause mega-project development in Africa to 
proportionally decline in importance (except those with compelling renewable resources that 
support an existing operationally-serviceable urban grid) and off-grid DER-based development 
to accelerate (especially to enable energy access in rural areas, which characterize the vast 
majority of the African geography). 
Picking Spots to Achieve Maximum Impact 
• Given scarcity of resources – both financial and human – relative to the aggregate needs for 
electricity advancement in Africa, attention should be focused first on countries or regions 
where tangible improvements are realistically possible.  There are many places in Africa where 
civil unrest, unstable/corrupt government institutions, or lack of electricity sector capabilities 
are so pronounced that any proactive efforts would unfortunately yield few results.  Thus, 
further work on African electricity should begin with identifying and working with a viable set of 
constituencies that can productively leverage the outcomes of efforts and investments. 
 
• The biggest single financial crisis facing the African electricity sector today involves the largest 
utility in SSA:  Eskom in RSA.  Eskom’s insolvency threatens to depress the RSA economy for 
years, and Eskom’s operational challenges are already driving increasing frequency of blackouts.  
Moreover, since Eskom is effectively the backbone of the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP), 
the electricity sector in other SAPP nations (Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) 
could also be jeopardized.  It is likely that Eskom will undergo a significant restructuring in the 
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coming years; in addition to monitoring for opportunities to assist Eskom directly, stakeholders 
should also consider support to SAPP and member nations as they cope with the side-effects of 
what is sure to be a major and painful organizational transformation.   
 
• Since each of them serves many countries, the five power pools spread across Africa might be 
high-leverage entry points for productive collaboration in advancing the electricity sector on the 
continent.  Success in working effectively with these organizations will require finding and 
developing strong relationships with trustworthy staff members in positions of authority.   
 
• From an environmental standpoint, the most pressing issue on the planet is climate change, 
which means curtailing CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion as quickly as possible.  On a 
global scale, Africa is a small contributor of CO2 emissions, but projected expansion of the 
electricity sector in a status quo manner implies a significant rate of growth in emissions – 
especially if ambitious energy access targets are to be met – due to the anticipated addition of 
new fossil-fuel fired capacity (mostly natural gas, but some coal and oil also).  To limit and 
reverse increasing CO2 emissions from the African electricity sector, it is vital that as much new 
capacity be built incorporating zero-carbon (i.e., renewable energy) technologies rather than 
relying upon fossil fuels.   In turn, environmental advocates should help African decision-makers 
identify and pursue economic renewable energy project alternatives to develop in lieu of each 
planned fossil fuel power plant addition. 
 
• In many urban areas of Africa, local air and noise pollution from diesel backup generators – used 
as a substitute for unreliable grid power – is a major and growing problem.  In addition to 
emissions, consumers spend significant sums to burn fuel in inefficiently self-supplying their 
power needs.  Targeted initiatives to improve grid electricity supplies in these urban areas, 
thereby reducing currently high utilization of the many small diesel generators found in most 
large African cities, could yield sizable economic and health benefits.  Meanwhile, the appeal of 
diesel generators would be reduced by cutting fossil fuel subsidies, which now exceed the 







• Figure 5-2:  Fossil Fuel Subsidies Outweigh Climate Finance in Many African Nations  
 
   
Source:  Think Outside the Grid:  Africa’s Trillion Dollar Energy Opportunity, DBL Partners, 2018 
 
African Electricity Sector Institutions Need Substantial Strengthening 
• Most major electricity companies in SSA are functionally insolvent.  This is due to a combination 
of mispriced electricity, inadequate revenue collection (including technical losses and theft), 
cost mismanagement, insufficient operational/managerial training and skill, and corruption.  
Therefore, to the extent that these organizations are likely to own/operate (or at least play a 
heavy role in implementing) new infrastructure, initiatives to effectuate electricity sector 
improvement in Africa must include concerted and effective efforts to improve utility 
governance, oversight and operations.  To make viable the massive investment opportunities, 
the global financial community should be especially motivated to ensure that institutional 
capability-building initiatives proceed in the electricity sector wherever in Africa that they can be 
productively launched. 
 
• As with the utilities themselves, regulatory institutions in Africa are generally considered to be 
weak, with only limited resources to provide oversight.  Regulatory staff may not be highly 
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trained on global best practices that most encourage electricity sector advancement, 
particularly for attracting investment in low-carbon generation and other delivery infrastructure.  
Improving the strength of African regulatory institutions must be a high priority if financially and 
environmentally sustainable advancement of the electricity sector is to be achieved. 
   
• Cross-border opportunities for joint planning and development of new electricity infrastructure 
in Africa are significant.  For instance, recent research by RMI indicates over $100 billion in 
cumulative savings could be achieved from 2024 to 2030 in East and West Africa if capacity and 
transmission planning were better coordinated between nations.xcvi  However, the mechanisms 
for implementing a viable project involving multiple countries (e.g., regional power pools) are 
generally only in early stages of development.  To the extent that attractive centralized grid 
infrastructure development opportunities (generation or transmission) require multinational 
coordination, strengthening of the relevant power pool(s) may first be required.   
 
• Africa currently lacks an institution analogous to the North American Electric Reliability Council 
(NERC) for establishing and enforcing consistent standards across the continent for grid planning 
and operations.  If such an institution in Africa existed, it could coordinate between national-
level energy authorities to encourage appropriate (and discourage unsound) multinational 
energy infrastructure development initiatives, make the regional power pools and their 
associated distribution grids more robust, and therefore improve the ability to attract capital for 
further expansion projects.   AFREC would seem to be a natural candidate to fill this institutional 
void. 
Electricity Sector Advancement Is Part of a Bigger Whole 
• Increasing energy access in a fiscally sustainable manner can only be achieved if wealth is 
created for both infrastructure investors and infrastructure users along the way.  An energy 
access program funded or otherwise supported by subsidies will eventually die under its own 
weight.  As a result, it may be more productive to focus energy access enhancement initiatives 
on improving electricity service to commercial/industrial/institutional customers – mostly 
located in urban and peri-urban areas rather than in rural areas – whereby the resulting 
increases in economic activity (via increased productivity, competitiveness and profitability) can 
eventually lead regional households to afford their own improvements in electricity service.  
More broadly, it is important for those in positions of power or influence to see electricity 
infrastructure expansion as deeply intertwined with – and neither subservient nor precedent to 
– long-term economic development. 
 
• Opportunities to expand African electricity infrastructure should be considered in tandem with 
other infrastructure development needs (e.g., drinking water supply, wastewater treatment, 
telecommunications, etc.) and industrial development activities (e.g., in mining) in order to 
maximize both cost and capability synergies.  Many places in Africa need “all of the above”, and 
it would be sensible to design infrastructure programs, make investments and establish 




Never Forget:  Advancing the Sector is First and Foremost About Serving the Needs of Africans 
• Sensitivity to national and local customs is critical in any initiative.  A solution deployed 
successfully somewhere in Africa will need some customization for successful deployment 
elsewhere – not just to account for economic differences in the two different geographies, but 
also for cultural and linguistic factors unique to the new location.  Each electricity advancement 
project brought to fruition needs to “fit” seamlessly within the local community, so that the 
local population can take emotional ownership of the project’s success rather than feel that a 
project has been thrust upon them – even if well-intended.   
 
• Any initiative to advance the electricity sector in Africa must be consistent with the preferences 
and beliefs of prospective customers.  In addition to undertaking actions that improve customer 
ability (and willingness) to pay – such as local economic development for wealth-creation 
purposes and provision of micro-credit to expand access to capital for obtaining electricity-
consuming devices – many Africans would benefit from systemic awareness-building on topics 
that increase the financial viability of electricity service while also improving the lives of those 
who use electricity.  Such topics include (but are not limited to):  how using electricity can 
improve their lives, introduction to electricity devices, payment options, and safety (i.e., how 
dangerous it is to steal electricity).  Additional customer-focused research is likely warranted. 
 
• Common definitions of electricity access should be used with care.  Universal access at an entry-
level (“Tier 1”) is often referenced as a goal of electricity sector development activities.  
Unquestionably, this degree of energy access is necessary, but remains insufficient:  by virtually 
any standard, Tier 1 levels of electricity consumption are minimal.  Therefore, success should 
not be declared as tranches of population gain Tier 1 access, as this degree of electricity supply 
remains inadequate for participating in the global economy and achieving a quality of life 
Westerners take for granted.  Rather, the introduction of Tier 1 access should be considered 
only a first “gateway” step on a path towards affordable electricity availability in quantities that 
can support true economic advancement – albeit without exacerbating climate change or 
imposing other environmental burdens. 
 
• It will take decades of concerted investment to eliminate the shortages of electricity generating 
capacity in most African countries.  Until these shortages are resolved, it is difficult to suggest 
that existing generation assets based on fossil fuels should be retired unless their ongoing costs 
exceed the costs of replacement zero-carbon (i.e., renewable) alternatives.  Africans bear 
minimal responsibility for human contributions to date towards climate change, and while Africa 
shouldn’t further worsen this increasingly pressing global problem, neither is it equitable that 
Africa take on disproportionate burden to (for example) retire well-functioning and cost-
competitive existing coal-fired generation and thereby worsen electricity shortages.  Provided it 
is in reasonably good operating condition, each installed and operational kilowatt of generating 





The above points summarize what is known with a high degree of confidence about the current state of 
and prospects for the African electricity sector.  As can be seen, the conclusions are at a high level of 
generalization.  This is because detailed information – which can only be gathered and intelligently 
interpreted for a specific set of assets or geographic area – is for the most part lacking.  In turn, this 
means that a going-forward research agenda for the African electricity sector must be regionally 
focused, dictated by which regions are most fruitful for investigation. 
Reflecting the above points, interventions – either research or investment – to advance the African 
electricity sector should be emphasized in countries that both (1) have the greatest needs for electricity 
sector advancement and (2) exhibit the best prospects for successful advancement.  In other words, 
incremental activities should be focused wherever chances for good traction to be gained for largest 
positive impact are reasonably high. 
As shown in the Section I of this paper, the five countries with the greatest needs for electricity sector 
advancement (as measured by number of people currently lacking electricity access) are Nigeria, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda. 
This research refrains from formally ranking countries according to where prospects for success may be 
the most promising.  Conclusions on which countries exhibit the most promise are not offered for the 
following reasons: 
• As the rapid recent deterioration of RSA and its state-owned electricity company Eskom 
illustrates, the situation facing any country can change (especially to the negative) very swiftly, 
thus overturning any positive assessment that might be made today. 
 
• Certain readers or stakeholders may have strong reasons (or no choice but) to press for 
advancement in locations that otherwise would not seem promising – and this research is not 
intended to deter such laudable efforts. 
 
• Even within countries that would not suggest themselves as particularly promising, there may 
be local geographic sub-regions wherein many elements of success are present and electricity 
sector advancement might be viable. 
 
• Across most of Africa, data quality and availability are inadequate to support making judgments 
on relative merit between countries. 
Wherever in Africa additional research is pursued on electricity issues, an initial goal should be to fill 
location-specific knowledge gaps on topics essential for effective electricity sector development 
activities.  Once a party has identified a specific geographic area in Africa worthy of exploring potential 
options for electricity sector advancement, a geographically focused research agenda should seek to 
answer the following questions to the next level of detail: 
• How can the current centralized grid be better leveraged? 
o What operational improvements (both in generation and in T&D) can reduce costs and 
losses, and improve reliability, quality and availability of electricity supply? 
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o How can the use of diesel backup generators be minimized? 
o When will the cost of operating existing fossil-fired power generation become more 
expensive than replacing with alternatives?  
o What can be done to ensure that tariffs accurately reflect costs and send proper price 
signals to induce appropriate investment and consumption decisions? 
o What can be done to improve customer willingness and ability to pay for electricity 
service? 
o What programs can be implemented effectively and efficiently to truly improve the 
institutional capabilities of utilities and overseeing authorities? 
 
• What should the expansion plan be for the centralized grid? 
o What is a robust (i.e., scenario-based) renewables-heavy future generation resource 
plan? 
o What new fossil-fired power plants are planned, and what renewable energy options 
might exist as better alternatives? 
o How can transnational power pools be better leveraged? 
o What new transmission development opportunities (including cross-border) are truly 
worthy of pursuit? 
o Which distribution upgrades and expansion plans (i.e., to bring service to new areas) 
should be prioritized? 
o What grid flexibility investments (energy storage, controls) will be necessary? 
 
• How should microgrids complement the centralized grid? 
o What can/should be done to strengthen the progress/success of existing microgrids? 
o Under what conditions, where specifically, and in what order should new microgrids be 
pursued? 
o What is a realistic trajectory for more off-grid customers more quickly to obtain energy 
access in increasing tiers? 
o Under what conditions should microgrids be connected to the centralized grid to enable 
more extensive volumetric growth in usage? 
o What standardized technical design and business model is optimal to fit the climate and 
culture? 
o How can subsidies and below-market capital sources be minimized for microgrids? 
o What local economic development and entrepreneurship roles should microgrids play 
for the communities they serve? 
In most places across the continent of Africa, the answers to these questions are generally not well 
understood.  Often, the underlying information isn’t publicly accessible (or doesn’t exist at all), and 
where the data might exist, the analysis to transform it into insight hasn’t been undertaken.   
Given that the available resources will be limited relative to the size of the continent-wide need or 
opportunity, parties seeking to bring power and progress to Africa should: 
• Focus most diligently on locales with both the greatest needs for electricity improvement and 
the greatest potential for success in implementing change,  
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• Forge strong collaborations with earnest counterparties in these environments to maximize the 
chances for long-term viability of the investments that they make, and 
• Undertake the above research agenda to fill in knowledge gaps and thereby gain a much more 
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